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ECOSYSTEM CO-MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS:
A STUDY OF NATION BUILDING OR A LESSON ON
EROSION OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY?
MARREN SANDERS1

ABSTRACT
This article examines tribal sovereignty and resource management
in the era of environmental self-determination through the lens of
the Cornell/Kalt model of "nation building" in Indian Country.
The nation building model holds that tribes can achieve selfdetermination by acting, thinking, being, and relating as independent, self-governing nations, regardless of whether they are
recognized as such by outsiders. After setting the stage, the article
looks at ecosystem management and species co-management
agreements that have been initiated between tribes and federal and
state agencies. In the framework of case studies, it focuses on the
elements of de facto sovereignty and analyzes the success of
various tribes' approaches to ecosystem co-management. It concludes that co-management agreements can offer significant benefits to Indian nations, but they can pose extraordinary challenges to
tribes and are not without risks. However, if crafted correctly,
these agreements can also motivate tribes to build nations.

199 Marren Sanders is Indigenous Law and Policy Curriculum Development
Manager with the Native Peoples Technical Assistance Office at the University
of Arizona. She received her S.J.D. (Doctorate in Law) in Indigenous Peoples
Law and Policy in 2007 from the UA James E. Rogers College of Law. Dr.
Sanders holds a J.D. from Suffolk University Law School (cum laude) and a
B.A. from the University of Vermont.
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INTRODUCTION

Although it is widely recognized that tribal governments and intertribal fish and wildlife management organizations have been
amongst the most effective stewards of natural resources, both on
tribal lands and off, today it is more than ever clear that in many
areas of Indian country, tribal governments are on the cutting edge
of new technological advances that are assuring
enhanced
2
resources.
plant
and
wildlife
and
fish
protections for
What is the meaning of the term ecosystem management?
Robert B. Keiter states that ecosystem management focuses on
entire ecosystems, not just individual resources, emphasizing the
need for "inter-jurisdictional coordination to ensure ecological
integrity and sustainable resource systems. ' 3 The ecosystem
management model, according to some scholars, is not new to
Native Americans. Dean B. Suagee suggests that the concept of
biodiversity and holistic land management has maintained tribal
connections to the natural world for generations and remains an
important aspect of Indian culture and identity today. 4
The tendency of the wolf or the salmon to cross political
boundaries, however, has caused tremendous conflict between
Indian and non-Indian peoples as to the authority or jurisdiction to
manage these resources. Keiter argues that in order to ensure
sustainable resources, ecosystem management should be based on
mutual responsibility without regard for existing boundaries.
However, conflicting federal agency mandates make it difficult to
translate this principle into a workable policy. 5 Martin H. Belsky
2 Status of Tribal Fish And Wildlife Management Programs:HearingBefore the

S.Committee on Indian Affairs,

10 8 th

Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Sen. Daniel

K. Inouce, Vice Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
3 Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of
Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 293, 295 (1994). "Ecosystem" is

defined as "the complex of a community of organisms and its environment
functioning as an ecological unit."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGATE
DICTIONARY 394 (1Ith ed. 2003).
4 Dean B. Suagee, The Cultural Heritage of American Indian Tribes and the
Preservationof BiologicalDiversity, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 483, 487 (1999).

5 E.g.,, the U.S. Forest Service, which operates under a multiple-use directive,
and the U.S. Park Service, which operates under a preservationist mandate.
Robert B. Keiter, supra note 3, at 328-329, 303 (1994).

2007]

ECOSYSTEM CO-MANAGEMENT

adds that when resources are shared by multiple sovereigns, each
government is reluctant to relinquish control and often seeks to
maximize 6returns on the resource to the exclusion of other
sovereigns.
Tribal sovereign rights to govern their people, lands, and
resources have been recognized in varying degrees since the time
of first contact with European nations. However, conflicting
federal policies toward Indian tribes have made this task difficult
and courts often complicate the issue. For example, the Marshall
Trilogy, three important cases decided in the early days of the
United States Supreme Court, included the principle that tribes are
"domestic, dependent nations" that have only the right of
occupancy, not fee ownership in their lands.7 As "diminished
sovereigns" tribes retain only those inherent sovereign powers to
that have not been taken away by
manage their lands and resources
8
power.
plenary
Congressional
Over time, though the legal concept of tribal sovereignty
remained, its scope was altered as the United States assumed
greater authority over Indian lands. 9 Federal policies reflected
little understanding for traditional Indian uses of and relationships
to the land.' 0 Those tribes willing to risk exercising their treatyreserved rights were often subjected to threats, physical assaults,
and property damage. Resulting litigation was costly and generally
left all parties unsatisfied and the disputed resource at risk of
further harm.

6

Martin H. Belsky, Indian Fishing Rights: A Lost Opportunityfor Ecosystem

Management, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 58 (1996).
7 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515

(1832).
8See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
9 See DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS,

1-6 (5th ed. 20005)
(describing complexity of legal relationship between tribes and the United
States).
10See, e.g., Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.) (dividing reservations
into 160 acre parcels for allotment to individual Indians for purpose of
agriculture).
JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
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In an effort to avoid litigation, and sometimes as a result of
court ordered settlements, an increasing number of Indian tribes
have entered into intergovernmental agreements with federal and
state agencies for the management of the natural resources and
wildlife on which they depend. The co-management regime is
complicated by ever changing federal policies toward Indian tribes
and the complex, often hostile relations between tribes and states.
Environmental protection policies initially included little or no
mention of Indian tribes."l There was little or no consideration as
to how the conservation of endangered species and the protection
of critical habitat would affect tribes. In addition, fundamental
misunderstanding and lack of respect for tribes' connection with
the land and unique expertise on environmental issues caused
continued conflict between the parties.12
With the emergence of the "self-determination" era in
federal Indian policy,' 3 tribal governments have moved in
directions that have allowed them to begin to be proactive in the
assertion of their right to self-government rather than reactive to
non-Indian initiatives that would affect the natural resources and
habitat on which their communities depend. As tribes reclaim
power over their own affairs they can reorganize relationships with
other governments and rebuild their institutional capacity for
effective self-governance. 14 According to Joseph P. Kalt and
Joseph William Singer, this "de facto" exercise of sovereignty is of
ultimate importance to a tribe's ability to self-rule. 15 The Native
Nations Institute for Leadership, Management, and Policy ("NNI")
'
See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2007)
(containing single subsection applicable only to Alaskan Native subsistence
needs).
12 See, e.g., Suagee, supra note 4, at 488 (noting conflicting views
as to whether
tribes were the original environmentalists or whether values and practices
simply enabled them to provide for current and future survival).
13 See GETCHES, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 9, 216-255
(Thomson West) (2005)

14 Stephen

Cornell, Miriam Jorgensen, Joseph P. Kalt, & Katherine A. Spilde,
Seizing the Future: Why Some Native Nations Do and Others Don't, 2005-01
JOINT OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON NATIVE AFF. 7.
15 Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph W.illiam Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal

Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule, 2004-03
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON NATIVE AFF. 5.

JOINT
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has referred to this type of initiative as a step to "nation building."
Nation building, as used by NNI, involves developing the tribe's
capacity to make and implement strategically informed decisions
based in self-determination, helping build sustainable communities
and economic development.' 6 These decisions were often more
productive and effective when there was "cultural 7match," fitting
with the tribe's cultural norms and understandings.'
This dissertation will examine ecosystem and species comanagement agreements that have been initiated between tribes
and federal and state agencies. Generally these agreements define
how the parties involved will exercise their own unique authorities
to work in concert to maintain healthy ecosystems. Memoranda of
Understanding or Agreement typically arise as a result of litigation,
brought on by cultural misunderstanding and jurisdictional confusion regarding the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") and other environmental legislation on tribal lands.
In the framework of case studies, this dissertation will
focus on the elements of de facto sovereignty and analyze the success of various tribes' approaches to ecosystem co-management.
Are these agreements exercises of de facto sovereignty? Do these
agreements advance or detract from tribal institutions and structures needed to administer ecosystem co-management? Are the
agreements a cultural match to the tribe(s)? Subjects include the
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, the Nez Perce Gray
Wolf Recovery Program, and the Great Lakes Indian Fish and
Wildlife Commission. Additional questions that will be examined
are: Is there a true government-to-government relationship
between the parties? Are the tribes participating in a power-sharing
regime or are they merely commentators on policy outside of their
control?
I conclude that co-management agreements, not unlike the
nation building approach, generally recognize that effective
institutional structures are needed to support objectives meant not
See Native Nations Institute: What is Native Nation Building, http://nni.
arizona.edu/whoweare/whatis.php. (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
17Stephen Cornell, Address at the Native American/Alaskan Native Economic
Development Conference: Five Myths, Three Partial Truths, A Robust Finding,
and Two Tasks, 4 (Apr. 19, 1994) (transcript available at http://www.ksg.
harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs/pub-l 31 .htm).
16

102 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
only for current short-term needs but also for future generations.
Though not without risk, these unprecedented government-togovernment agreements frequently reflect values meant to ensure
viable tribal communities through sustainable resource management and often include provisions that respect the individual
sovereign capabilities of the signatories. In other words, ecosystem co-management agreements, if crafted correctly, can motivate
tribes to build nations.
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

"So much trouble at hand, but I got to fight for freedom of
what belongs to me and all Indians in the nation throughout the
world. We were robbed out of everything. But, I am going to
cling to my fishing industry. "18
Tribal sovereign rights to govern their people, lands, and
resources have been recognized in varying degrees since the time
of first contract with European nations. Beginning with trade and
protection agreements entered into, prior to the establishment of
the United States as a republic free from British rule, it was in the
interest of the newly arrived Europeans to treat tribes as9
autonomous nations with the right to manage their own affairs.'
Indian dealings with their "discoverers" reflected assurances that
each would respect the other in their rights to self-rule.2 °
Over time, the scope of tribal sovereignty was altered in
concept as the United States assumed greater authority over Indian
lands. 21 For example, during the Allotment era, Indian land
18

Letter from Tommy Thompson, Celilo Village Chief, to Jasper Elliott,

Superintendent, Warm Springs Reservation (Oct. 31, 1946)

available at

http://www.ccrh.org/comm/river/docs/celilo.htm.
19ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, Jr., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 122 (Oxford University Press 1997)

(noting successful treaty enabled both sides to rely on "security, peace, and
happiness" in hostile dangerous new world).
20 Id. at 47 (stating encounter era diplomacy involved negotiating peace,
strategic alliance, commercial trade, prisoner exchange and rights of passage
through alien territory).
21 See David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, & Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1-6 (Thomson West 5th ed
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holdings were reduced from approximately 138 million acres to 48
million acres, creating a "checkerboard" of Indian, non-Indian,
state, county, and federal ownership of lands within reservation
boundaries. 22 This policy had profound effects on the ability of
Native nations to manage the lands and natural resources on which
their people and cultures depended.
While tribal concepts of environmental management cannot
be generalized, Rebecca Tsosie states that indigenous people base
their relationship with the environment on "concepts of respect and
duty rather than rights and claims. 23 Describing tribal lands and
resources as a trust corpus, Mary Christina Wood holds that it is
fundamental that any sovereign trustee, including tribes, owes a
duty towards its present and future citizens to protect the corpus of
the trust.24 She notes that traditional tribal concepts of resource
management centered on stewardship and preserving the resource
for future generations.
This stewardship, she states, was mandated by law defined in the spiritual rather than the written context

2005) (describing the complexity of legal relationship between tribes and the
United States).
22 Readjustment of Indina Affairs:Hearing on H.R. 7902 Before the Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 73rd Cong. 15-17 (1934) (provided that reservations would be
divided into 160 acre parcels and allotted to individual Indians for the purpose
of agriculture. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (2007)).
Allotments were held in trust by the federal government for twenty-five years or
until the Indian landowner was considered "competent" to hold the land in fee.
Id. Any reservation lands left over after allotment were considered "surplus"
and were opened for homesteading and white settlement. Lands also passed into
non-Indian hands when trust restrictions were lifted and they became subject to
state property taxes. See also President Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union
Message Dec. 3, 1901 http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/sotul.html (calling
allotment a "mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass").
23
Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of SelfDetermination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological
Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 281 (1996) quoting Randy Kapashesit &
Murray Klippenstein, Aboriginal Group Rights and Environmental Protection,
36 McGILL L.J. 925, 925 (1991).
24 Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal PropertyRight To Wildlife Capital
(PartI):
Applying Principles of Sovereignty To Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations,
37 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 83-84 (2000).
25 Id.at 70.
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that characterized Euro-Christian tradition.26 According to Ed
Goodman, many tribes recognized the necessity of shared
management and authority to protect and preserve cross-boundary
resources. 27 This management included not only 2 8allocation, but
regulation of human activity that harmed resources.
Lorie M. Graham reminds us that strategic planning is not
new to tribes. Prior to conquest and colonization, tribal societies
planned their communities in accordance with a collective
ideology that emphasized values associated with territory, landtenure, and stewardship rather than on the "privileges associated
with private property rights" that European nations relied on.2 9
Wood agrees that historical tribal management often escapes the
attention of modem-day scholars.3 ° She argues that a central
component of environmental management has always been human
restraint, achieved through appropriate social mechanisms. 3' One
reason that pre-treaty tribal management has essentially been
ignored is that tribal management is fundamentally different than
that used in industrial society today. 32 Non-Indian environmental

management relies on written regulations and judicial enforcement
while traditional tribal society achieve the same through reliance
on cultural norms and spiritual mandates. 33 Wood argues, though
this social mechanism was effective, it has been discredited as
merely a cultural or religious rite rather
than a firm component of
34
management.
environmental
sovereign
Dean B. Suagee adds that because tribal cultures are
embedded in the land and its resources, scholars often can not
26
27

Id. at 70.
Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat for Off-Reservation Tribal Hunting and

FishingRights: Tribal Co-management as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. L. 279,

309
(2000).
28
Id. at 309.
29

Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian

Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597, 615 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
30

Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal PropertyRight to Wildlife Capital(PartII):

Asserting a Sovereign Servitude to Protect Habitatof ImperiledSpecies, 25 VT.
L. REV. 355, 371 (2001).
31 id.
32
Id. at 373.
33 Id,

34

Id. at 374.
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decide whether tribes were the original environmentalists or
whether their values and practices simply enabled them to provide
for their needs and the needs of generations to come. While
Ronald L. Trosper states that the resilience of ecosystems can
depend on everyone abiding by the environmental ethics of the
community by showing respect for the land which provides for
humans. 35 Whatever the reasons, Indian environmental management often takes into account their unique relationship with the
land. This relationship includes legal, political, cultural, and spiritual dimensions, and for tribes control over their territories and
resources which can be a critical aspect of their sovereignty.
III. CO-MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS

Over the last few decades, an increasing number of Indian
tribes have exercised their sovereignty by entering into intergovernmental agreements with federal and state environmental
agencies regarding natural resources and wildlife. The co-management scheme is one complicated by ever changing federal policies
toward tribes and the complex, often hostile relations between
tribes and states. Environmental protection policies initially
included little or no mention of Indian tribes.36 There was little or
no consideration as to how the conservation of endangered species
and the protection of critical habitat would affect them. In
addition, fundamental misunderstanding and lack of respect for
tribes' connection and unique expertise on environmental issues
caused continued conflict between the parties. 37 Tribes often
possess a unique and valuable expertise regarding natural resources. While agencies are aware of the tribal right to protection of
these resources, they often "strenuously
resist" the tribes' aspira38
role.
co-management
a
tion toward

Suagee, supra note 4, at 488; Ronald L. Trosper, Northwest Coast Indigenous
Institutions that Supported Resilience and Sustainability, 41 Ecological Econ.
329, 340 (2002).
36 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(2007) (contain35

ing single subsection applicable only to Alaskan Native subsistence needs).
37 See, e.g., Suagee, supra note 35, at 488.
38 Goodman, supra note 27, at 283-284.
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As tribes became more pronounced in asserting their
sovereign rights to manage or co-manage natural resources both on
and off the reservation, intergovernmental agreements became
more common. Co-management, however, like ecosystem management, is not clearly defined. According to Goodman, co-management is the concept and practice of multiple sovereigns working
together to address and solve matters of mutual concern to each.39
He suggests that rather than a demand for tribal veto power over
projects, co-management is a request that federal and state
governments end unilateral decision-making affecting tribal rights
and resources and instead incorporate the policy and technical
expertise of each sovereign in a mutual, participatory framework.4 °
Megan Cahill and Stephen Cornell hold that co-management agreements are not only effective for resource management
but are political tools as well.4 ' They note, however, that many
indigenous nations object to the term "co-management" because it
implies equality in decision making that is frequently absent from
the agreements. Coining the term "Intergovernmental Resource
Management Agreement (IRMA)," Cahill and Cornell suggest that
these agreements are often brought on by resource crises, the
desire to avoid litigation, and the limited capacities of both
indigenous and non-indigenous governments to manage resources
independently. 42 The resulting agreements, they note, are "hugely
diverse, reflecting.., local contexts and histories, the nature of the
resources at issue, legal regimes, and the often divergent agendas
of the parties involved. 43

39

Id. at 284-285. Goodman suggests that a successful co-management scheme

must include the following principles:

1) recognition of tribes as sovereign

governments; 2) incorporation of United States trust responsibility; 3) legitimate
structures for tribal involvement; 4) integration of tribes early in the decisionmaking process; 5) recognition and incorporation of tribal expertise; and 6)
dispute
resolution mechanisms. Id at 343-348.
40
Id.at 285.
41 Meagan Cahill and Stephen Cornell, Power-Sharing in Intergovernmental
Resource Management Agreements with North American Indigenous Nations,

(

forthcoming) (on file with author).
42 Id. IRMAs are defined as any agreement between two or
more governments
that involves some degree of cooperation in natural-resource management. Id.
43 Id.
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Cahill and Cornell suggest that there are different levels of
power sharing in the co-management approach. "Parity" involves
joint decision-making in management of the resource, or what is
sometimes called "true co-management." "Consent" gives the
junior partner veto power or the right of review over management
decisions. The "Advisory" level is a formalized role for the junior
partner and typically specifies the form of their participation in
decision-making. "Consultation" is the requirement that the
decision-maker consult with other governments but does not
include the requirement that the decision-maker respond to the
other party's concerns. Finally, "Notification" is the recognition
by the primary decision-maker that other parties have an interest in
the resource and should be notified of management decisions, but
has no requirement that those parties be consulted.4
Zellmer argues that co-management agreements are effective vehicles for balancing the United States' trust responsibility
with species conservation, which can help avoid the need for
"heavy-hand federal controls," and are beneficial, both with
respect to species conservation and the promotion of inter-governmental relationships. 45 Kevin Gover and James B. Cooney add
that all parties benefit when disputes over unclear governmental
authority end with workable compromises emphasizing cooperation and specific responsibilities
instead of "time-consuming,
46
wars.
turf
expensive
Intergovernmental agreements can serve both Indian and
non-Indian communities by reducing cross-jurisdictional disputes
and providing flexible and effective ways to manage interjurisdictional environmental resources.47 These agreements can
help tribal sovereigns become more proactive rather than reactive
to proposals, activities, and authorizations developed by other
parties and can offer significant benefits to Indian nations, but they
44 Id.

Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian Lands as Critical Habitatfor Indian Nations and
EndangeredSpecies: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First, 43 S.D. L.
REV. 381, 436 (1998).
46 Kevin Gover & James B. Cooney, Cooperation Between Tribes and States in
Protectingthe Environment, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 35 (1996).
47 Shelly D. Stokes, Note, Ecosystem Co-Management Plans: A Sound
Approach or a Threat to Tribal Rights?, 27 Vt. L. REv. 421 (2003).
45
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can pose extraordinary challenges to tribes and are not without
risks.
IV. BENEFITS OF THE CO-MANAGEMENT APPROACH

The ravages of technological pollution and the
masquerade of politics as law and science have led
us to a threshold of uncertainty. Indian people must
not depend upon the customary authorities to
guarantee the protection and preservation of our
culture ...

To avoid our own cultural destruction,

we will have to prove to the world the genius of
tribally held cultural values.48
Environmental issues are of great importance to tribes and
disputes over the management of these resources can serve as a
call to action for Indian communities. As the case studies will
show, co-management regimes vary according to the parties and
the environmental context at issue.. Natural resource management
for Native nations includes not only land based rights, but also
treaty protected off-reservation resources, and is complicated
further by the cross-jurisdictional nature of fish and wildlife. As
Native nations assert their decision-making authority over the
management of natural resources both on and off-reservation
lands, they often encounter resistance and the co-management
approach is one solution to this problem. This section considers
the benefits of the co-management approach.
Since the 1970s tribal governments have moved in
directions that have allowed them to begin to be proactive in the
assertion of their right to self-government rather than reactive to
non-Indian initiatives that would affect the natural resources and
habitat on which their communities depend. As tribes reclaim
power over their own affairs they can reorganize relationships with
other governments and rebuild their institutional capacity for
48

Mary C. Wood, Protectingthe Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust

Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995
UTAH L. REV. 109, 237 n. 546 (1995) (quoting Ted Strong, Executive Director

of the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission).
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effective self-governance. 4 9 Ecosystem co-management agreements can be a valuable step in this process.
Ecosystem co-management agreements can provide tribes
with a unique opportunity to preserve their lands and treaty
reserved resources for the benefit of present and future generations
to use, protect, and/or restore the natural environments that sustain
their cultures. 50 At the same time, these agreements can show nonIndian governments that tribes are ready, willing, and able to
assume the responsibilities of sovereignty, and that they have the
necessary expertise to participate as co-managing sovereigns over
their resources.51
Goodman holds that tribal rights to participate as sovereign
governments in decision making are grounded in the foundational
principles of federal Indian law: that tribes are inherent sovereigns
with both the "governmental authority and responsibility to protect
the health and welfare, the political integrity, and the economic
security of their people." 52 This statement of "de jure" or
sovereignty given by law certainly supports Native nations in their
efforts to participate in the management of the natural resources on
which their people depend. However, tribes must also have in
place competent, capable governmental institutions, for it is one
thing to claim the right of co-management; it is another thing to
exercise that right effectively.
By engaging in successful "concrete acts" of self-governance, tribes can turn this de jure status into de facto reality.53 In
addition, the more effective non-Indians perceive tribal environmental programs to be in protecting public interests, the more
likely these programs will have critical public support if they come
under attack.54

'9

Cornell, Jorgensen, Kalt, & Spilde, supra note 14, at 7.

50 Dean B. Suagee & Christopher T. Steams, Indigenous Self-Government, Environmental Protection, and the Consent of the Governed: A Tribal Environmental Review Process, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 59, 82 (1994).
51Goodman, supra note 27, at 359.
52 id. at 358.
53 Kalt & Singer, supra note 15 at 23.
54 Sauge & Steams, supra note 50, at 85. See also Comment, Derrick A. Bell,

Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
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Other benefits of the co-management approach can be more
practical. First, depending on the level of power sharing, tribes can
put themselves in a position to more effectively deal with parties
whose economic and other interests in natural resources are often
detrimental to tribal interests.5 5 As co-sovereigns tribes spend more
time in strategic planning for their resources, rather than "putting
out fires" as non-Indian proposals and policies affecting them are
developed the more effective they will be. A co-management role
can also help put tribal environmental scientists on a more equal
footing with federal and state experts and can help provide
funding
56
that may normally not be available absent agreements.
Co-management agreements can help strengthen government-to-government relationships by lowering cultural barriers
between tribes and federal and state agencies. However, lowering
barriers does not necessarily lead to cultural understanding. By
increasing cultural understanding the parties can increase the
possibility of finding effective solutions to inter-jurisdictional
environmental issues and reduce the risk of litigation. 57 Comanagement agreements can also help tribes gain a "seat at the
table." That seat, however, may not be that of a co-equal sovereign. Participating in a power-sharing regime could mean that
58
tribes are merely commentators on policies outside their control.

L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (suggesting minority interests will be
accommodated only when they converge with interests of majority).
55 See Cahill & Cornell, supra note 41, at 11-13 (describing levels of powersharing in intergovernmental agreements).
56 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Tribal - USDA-Forest Service
relations on National Forest Lands Within the Terristories Ceded in Treaties of
1836,1837, and 1842,§§ VI(A)(3)(d), VI(A)(4), June 1999, USDA Forest
Service, Eastern Region, available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r9/cnnf/reports/mou/
mou-rev.pdf. (last visited November 17, 2007) [hereinafter GLIFWC MOU] (
For example in the GLIFWC MOU the parties agree to cooperate in identifying
and seeking funding to improve the implementation of the agreement; GLIFWC
MOU, §§ VI(A)(3)(d), VI(A)(4).) See also Suagee & Steams, supra note 41, at
86.(stating tribal governments typically do not have revenue sources comparable
to federal and state governments)
57 See, e.g., GLIFWC MOU, supra note 56, § VI(A)(5) (requiring all parties
participate in cultural sensitivity training and engage in joint and coordinated
public education efforts).
58 See, Cahill &Cornell, supra note 41, at 11-13.
HARV.
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While there are intrinsic benefits to tribes in adopting the
co-management approach to natural resource protection,
preservation, and restoration, there are also risks that must be
considered before a tribe makes the decision to participate in such
an agreement. A later section examines some of these risks. What
follows is a look at the ability of Native nations to manage their
lands and environmental resources in a world complicated by
federal policies and state challenges. Tribes have endeavored to
meet these challenges head on as they defend and advance their
rights of self-governance.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION CAUSES UNCERTAINTY
OVER TRIBAL RIGHTS

The emergence of the self-determination era in the 1960s
and 1970s brought sweeping policy changes toward Indian tribes
in the United States. 59 The 1970s also saw enactment of the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), a statute that, because of its
broad-sweeping application and stringent requirements, has been
considered one of the strongest environmental laws ever created.6 °
Designed to conserve threatened wildlife species and the ecosystems upon which they depend, the ESA prohibits any person from
taking a listed species or adversely modifying occupied or
otherwise essential habitat. 6' When federal actions are involved,
59 In 1970 President Richard Nixon officially ended the Termination Era and
urged Congress to adopt legislation providing for greater tribal autonomy and
control of their people, lands, and resources.
See Special Message to the
Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970).
His
recommendations led to the new "self-determination" policy and passage of the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, which
provided for the first time that tribal programs, while funded by the federal
government, could be planned and administered by the tribes themselves. See
25 U.S.C. §§ 450a (2007).
60 See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (stating
Congress intended protection of endangered species to be afforded highest
priority and ESA enacted to halt and reverse trend towards species extinction,
whatever the cost).
61 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a) (2007). Under the ESA, a taking means to "harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19) (2007).
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the ESA requires consultation to ensure that the action is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat on
which the species depends. 62 The ESA is silent as to Native
Americans with one exception pertaining to Native Alaskans.63
Confusion around whether the ESA applies or should apply
to tribes or Indian land has generated much scholarly debate and
several legal disputes. 64 To date the only Supreme Court case that
has come close to the issue is United States v. Dion.65 In this
appeal from an Eighth Circuit finding regarding a member of the
Yankton Sioux tribe who had taken four bald eagles in violation of
the ESA and the Bald Eagle Protection Act, the Court did not reach
the issue of whether the ESA applied to the Native defendant and
abrogated his treaty rights. Instead, the Court held that he could be
prosecuted under the Bald Eagle Protection Act because section
668a of the act provided that the Secretary of the Interior may
allow Indians to take eagles by permit for religious purposes. The
Court held that this served as clear evidence of Congress' intent
that unauthorized66 takings would not be allowed, treaty rights
notwithstanding.

In addition to conflicts regarding treaty reserved rights,
many tribes considered the ESA's single-species management
approach too narrow when compared to the tribes' holistic
sustainable use practices and that any attempt to regulate Indians
under the ESA implied that tribes lacked the capability to manage

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2007).
The ESA contains a single subsection which provides an exemption from the
takings prohibition for Native Alaskans and non-native permanent residents of
Alaska Native villages, if the taking is primarily for subsistence purposes. 16
U.S.C. § 1539(e) (2007).
62

63

See, e.g., Robert J. Miller, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties,
Salmon, and the EndangeredSpecies Act, 70 Or. L. REV. 543 (1991) (arguing
64

the ESA does not abrogate treaty rights); See also, Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian
Lands as Critical Habitatfor Indian Nations and EndangeredSpecies: Tribal
Survival and Sovereignty Come First,43 S.D. L. REV. 381 (1998) (contending
critical habitat designation in Indian Country enforces external, non-tribally
driven prerogatives, thereby interfering with tribal sovereignty).
65 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
66 Id. at 745.
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their resources. 67 In other environmental areas, tribal rights and
authority were more clearly defined. For example, both the Clean
Water and Clean Air Acts contain provisions whereby tribes can be
"treated as states" ("TAS"). 6' These TAS provisions authorize
tribes, if they meet certain criteria, to be treated as states by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and may assume
various regulatory responsibilities over activities within Indian
country, including issuing permits and setting various environmental quality standards.
With the advent of "self-determination," tribal governmental functions expanded to include not only environmental standards
but health care, education, taxation, and the regulation of both
Indians and non-Indians within reservation boundaries. In many
cases, non-Indians or state governments challenged tribal authority, raising issues of whether federal, state, or tribal jurisdiction
applied. These challenges were made ever more complicated by
the "checkerboard" land ownership patterns left by the Allotment
Act and the inter-jurisdictional nature of water, air and wildlife.
The EPA complicated the issue with seemingly conflicting
policy statements. While indicating that it was ready and willing
to work with tribes on a government-to-government basis and that
it would recognize tribal governments as the "primary parties for
setting standards, making environmental policy decisions and
managing programs for reservations," this recognition was qualified. 69 The EPA takes the position that sound environmental
management requires that only one government have regulatory
authority over an Indian reservation. It will authorize environmental program management to the government-state or tribalthat can demonstrate adequate jurisdiction throughout the

67

Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal

Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72
WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (1997).
68

Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1377 (2007); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7474

(2007).
69 U.S. EPA, EPA Policyfor the Administration of Environmental Programs on

Indian Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984) http://www.epa.gov/indian/1984.htm.
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reservation. 70 U.S. Supreme Court decisions make it even harder
for Indian nations to determine whether tribal authority, state
authority, or both will be upheld. A number of cases have steadily
eroded tribal sovereign authority, particularly in regards to their
jurisdiction over non-Indian lands located within reservation
boundaries. 7 '

Jurisdictional battles make environmental regulation in
Indian Country difficult as no sovereign-federal, state, or tribalwants to relinquish any of its authority. Federal policies have also
often shown little understanding for traditional Indian uses of and
relationships to the land, resulting in costly litigation that generally
leaves all parties unsatisfied and the disputed resource at risk of
further harm. 72 Judicial review of agency decisions is commonly
procedural and damages, if awarded, are generally limited to costs
and the value
of the resource, an amount notoriously difficult to
73
calculate.

In addition, many tribes want the resource returned and the
ecosystem restored rather than monetary compensation for its
loss. 74 Given the options, many tribes decided to take advantage of
70

Memorandum from the Administration of U.S. E.P.A., Federal, Trial, and

State Roles in the Protection and Regulation of Reservation Environments (July
10, 1991) (on file with author).
7' See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980)
affd New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (recognizing regulatory authority of tribe over wildlife on Indian lands within
reservation); See also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). Brendale is an excellent example of
confusion where a no majority opinion held that county zoning authority
controlled non-member fee land in the "open" area of the Yakima reservation,
but tribal zoning laws governed non-member fee land in the "closed" area.
72 Eric Henson & Jonathan B. Taylor, Final Working Draft, Native
America at
the New Millennium, p. 200 (July 11, 2001) available at http://www.ksg.
harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs/pub_004.htm.
73 Starla Kay Roels, Borrowing Instead of Taking: How the Seemingly Opposite
Threads of Indian Treaty Rights and Property Rights Activism Could Intertwine
to Restore Salmon to the Rivers, 28 ENVTL. L. 375, 405 (1998); See also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2007) (governing judicial
review of final agency actions for which there is no other adequate remedy in a

court).

See 1d,("[t]ribal people want the fish and the ecosystem restored, not simply
dollars.") quoting Ted Strong, Executive Director of the Columbia River Inter74
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the self-determination era's policies. 75 Rather than wait for
continuing recognition of their right to self-governance (and the
very real possibility that Congress or the courts would cartwheel
back into a termination era mentality) Indian nations decided that it
was time to practice the sovereignty promised 76by law; inherent
sovereignty that "remains until it is taken away."
VI.

ENVIRONMENTAL SELF-DETERMINATION

"Sovereignty ... serves to remind states that when
an issue arises touching upon another sovereign's
territory or people the international community
expects the sovereigns to deal with one another
rather than attempt to resolve the matter
unilaterally.77
The shift to the self-determination era was a crucial
development for Indian nations. Tribal sovereignty, promised by
law but denied by federal paternalism and control, now stood a
chance of becoming more than just a paper right.78 With the
passage of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act of 1975, tribes began seeking control of their own programs
including law enforcement, health services and education, cultural
resource protection, and on-reservation land and resource
Tribal Fish Commission; See also, United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448
U.S. 371 (1980) (just compensation instead of return of the land awarded for
loss of the Black Hills).
15 Stephen Cornell &Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to Economic
Development
on American Indian Reservations: One Works, the Other Doesn't, 2005-02
JOINT OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON NATIVE AFF. 13.
76 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (stating prior to European
contact tribes were self-governing, sovereign political communities but some
aspects of inherent sovereignty divested by treaties, statutes, and federal trust
relationship).
77 Michael R. Fowler and Julie M. Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State:
The Evolutional and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty, p. 14 (1995) as
quoted in Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat for Off-Reservation Tribal Hunting
and Fishing Rights: Tribal Co-Management as a Reserved Right, 30 Envtl. L.
279, 323 (2000).
78 Cornell & Kalt, supra note 75, at 13.
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Various legislative acts and executive policy

statements slowly recognized tribal rights to consultation and

management or co-management of resources that were of
significance to them. 79 "[T]he door to practical sovereignty-selfrule-had been opened. 8 °
In some cases, the "de facto" door opened to resources
outside of reservation boundaries as tribes attempted to regulate
the exercise of off-reservation hunting and fishing rights, to
exercise jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, and to protect
and control the disposition of Indian human remains and funerary
items. As tribes began to assert control over their own affairs, the
courts, at times, supported their regulatory reach. 8 1 The federal
government's trust obligation was also used to enforce tribal
expectations that reserved rights resources would be protected.8 2
The trust responsibility alone, however, was not enough to
guarantee the security of the ecosystems on which these resources
depended.8 3 Sandi B. Zellmer conlcudes that just as federal
sovereignty is the core of the trust responsibility, reservation lands
are critical to tribal rights of self-governance. 84 Given the
importance of tribal lands and resources to the well-being of Indian
nations, "environmental self-determination"-the right to exercise
79 See, e.g., Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C.
§ 470

(cc) (requiring that at request of tribe involved, avoidance and mitigation terms
and conditions must be included in issued permit); See also Memorandum on
Government-to-Gorvernment Relations with Native American Tribes, 30
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 936 (Apr. 29, 1994)[hereinafter Memorandum]
(stating executive agencies must consult, to greatest extent practicable and to
extent permitted by law, with tribal governments prior to taking actions that
affect them).
80 Cornell & Kalt, supra note 75, at 13
81See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding
EPA's approval of stringent water quality standards established by Pueblo of
Isleta, which would require expensive upgrades to City's wastewater treatment
plant upstream); See also Montana v. United States EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 ( 9 th Cir.
1998) (holding regulation which allowed tribes to exercise authority over nonIndians owning fee interests within reservation reflected appropriate delineation
and application of inherent Tribal regulatory authority).
82 Goodman, supra note 27, at 289-90.
83 Id. at 301 (2000) (noting that United States has great deal
of flexibility in
interpreting and implementing its role in protecting tribal resources).
84 Zellmer, supra note 45, at 386.
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stewardship, sustainability, and the utilization of natural resources
-is critical to tribal sovereignty.85 Zellmer adds that:
the fedetal government, in keeping with its trust
responsibility to help preserve the political, physical, and cultural integrity of Indian Nations, and
should advance programs and policies which foster
environmental self-determination and avoid inter86
ference with tribal priorities, norms and values.
This includes the right of consultation so that Indian nations can 87
meaningfully participate in decisions that affect tribal resources.
A.

Consultation: De Recto, De Jure, or De Facto Sovereignty?

Consultation between tribes and federal and state agencies
is frequently a difficult and frustrating process. Often brought on
by court order or as a settlement of potential litigation, Indian
nations commonly feel that their concerns are not taken seriously
while federal and state officials feel that tribes do not appreciate
the constraints they are bound to in decision making.. 8 While
internal agency policies advocate government-to-government relations, the ability of tribes to participate as decision makers with
enforceable rights is often ambiguous, the role of tribal governments in making decisions regarding their resources can become
commentary, rather than substantive. 8
The Nixon Administration advocated tribal self-determination as the way to "strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy
Id. at 416-17 (quoting Tsosie supranote 23, at 227).
1d. at417
87
Id. at 389.
88 Suagee, supra note 4, at 530.
89 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000) (stating
85

86

agencies shall respect Indian tribal self-government and sovereignty and honor
tribal treaty and other rights but that order intended only to improve internal
management of executive branch and not intended to create any right, benefit, or
trust responsibility, enforceable at law against United States, its agencies, or any
person). See also Cahill & Cornell, supra note 49 (describing levels of powersharing in intergovernmental agreements).
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without threatening his sense of community." 90 Subsequent administrations affirmed this concept, 9' but it was the Clinton
administration that took the first significant step toward defining
consultation with Indian tribes. In his memorandum "Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal
Governments," President Clinton required that executive agencies
consult, to the greatest extent practicable and to the extent
permitted by law,
with tribal governments prior to taking actions
92
them.
affect
that
Unfortunately, the Clinton Memorandum is also clear in
that it is intended only to improve internal management and not
create any enforceable rights. 93 The Clinton Memorandum was
supplemented by later executive orders that further defined federal
agency responsibility, but also each contained the same disclaimer
that no enforceable rights were created. 9 4 In the end, it would not
be the executive branch but the agencies themselves that implemented guidelines recognizing tribes as the proper governmental
agencies to manage tribal lands and resources. For example, on
June 5, 1997 Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and Secretary
of Commerce William Daley issued the jointly-released Secretarial
Order 3206 to encourage consultation, and the creation of

90 Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, supra note 59, at 564.

91 See Indian Policy: Statement of Ronald Reagan I PUB. PAPERS (Jan. 24,

1983), reprinted in, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 302304 (Francis Paul Prucha, ed., University of Nebraska Press) (1975))

(reaffirming government-to-government relationship and moving White House
liaison for federally-recognized tribes to Office of Intergovernmental Affairs);
see also Statement of George Bush on Indian Policy (June 14, 1991) reprintedin
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, p. 335-336 (Francis Paul

Prucha, ed., University of Nebraska Press 2000) (1975) (recognizing and
reaffirming unique government-to-government relationship).
92 Memorandum, supra note 79, at 936..
93 Id.
94 See Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May

14, 1998) (each

agency to have effective process by which tribal governments can provide input
regarding development of regulatory practices on Federal matters that
significantly or uniquely affect their communities); See also Exec. Order No.
13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000) (stating agencies must have process
of accountability to ensure meaningful and timely input by tribal officials in
development of regulatory policies that have tribal implications).
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government-to-government
ecosystems.
A.

partnerships

to

promote

119
healthy

Secretarial Order 3206

Secretarial Order 3206 ("SO 3206") had its beginnings in
late 1995 when an ad-hoc group, comprised mostly of tribal
resource managers and tribal lawyers, held a series of conference
calls to determine a course of action regarding the pending
reauthorization of the ESA; a reauthorization that otherwise was
very likely to take place without tribal input.95 The group decided
that the issue was one of national importance to the tribes, and the
first tribal workshop on the ESA met in Seattle, Washington in
February 1996.96 The participants authorized a report that set out
principal findings and detailed an emerging consensus as to how
tribes should proceed under the ESA. The participants organized a
working group, comprised of twenty-five people from all regions
97
of the country, to examine legislative and administrative options.
The working group recommended that the tribes pursue a
joint secretarial order by the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce based on the concept of the 1994 Statement of Relationship
between the White Mountain Apache Tribe and the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, personally negotiated by Chairman
Ronny Lupe and Director Mollie Beattie. 98 The 1994 Statement
emphasized avoiding ESA conflicts through good, cooperative
tribal land management. However, it did not explicitly refer to the
99
ESA, and took no position on the ESA's applicability to the tribe.
The working group put together a draft position paper and in
September 1996 meetings between tribal and federal agency
95 Wilkinson, supra note 67, at 1066.
96 id.

97 Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal
Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72
WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1074 (1997).
98 Id.

99 Id. The tribes believed that a joint order based in the White Mountain Apache
Statement of Relationship might result in deference to tribal sovereignty and
good working relationships with the federal agencies, as well as prevent or at
least diminish the need for legislation or litigation. Id at 1075.
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representatives began. On June 5, 1997 Secretary of the Interior
Bruce Babbitt and Secretary of Commerce William Daley issued
the jointly-released Secretarial Order 3206 entitled "American
Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and the
Endangered Species Act."
Secretarial Order 3206 explicitly states that because of the
unique government-to-government relationship between Indian
tribes and the United States, the Departments of Interior and Commerce ("Departments") and affected tribes need to establish and
maintain effective working relationships and mutual partnerships
to promote the conservation of sensitive species (including candidate, proposed, and listed species) and the health of ecosystems
upon which they depend. 00 Such relationships are to focus on
cooperative assistance, consultation, the sharing of information,
and the creation of government-to-government
partnerships to
0
ecosystems.'
healthy
promote
To achieve the objectives of SO 3206, the Departments are
to ensure that five principles are followed. 10 2 The Departments are
to:

1.

work directly with Indian tribes on a government-togovernment basis to promote healthy ecosystems;

2.

recognize that Indian lands are not subject to the same
controls as federal public lands;

3.

take affirmative steps to assist Indian tribes in developing
and expanding tribal programs that promote healthy ecosystems, recognize that Indian tribes are appropriate governmental entities to manage their lands and tribal trust
resources, and, as trustees, support tribal measures that
preclude the need for conservation restrictions;

'00 Sec. Order No. 3206, § 4, American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal- Tribal
Trust Responsibilities and the Endangered Species Act, Department of the
Interior and Department of Commerce (June 5, 1997), available at http://www.
fws.gov/southwest/es/arizona/Documents/MiscDocs/Sec%200rd%203206.pdf
[hereinafter SO 3206].
101Id.
102 Id. at § 5
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4.

be sensitive to Indian culture, religion and spirituality; and

5.

facilitate the mutual exchange of information related to
tribal trust resources and Indian lands, and strive to protect
sensitive tribal information from disclosure.

Embodied in these principles is the duty to consult with and
seek the participation of tribes. The Departments are to recognize
that Indian tribes are governmental sovereigns with inherent power
to make and enforce laws, administer justice, manage and control
Indian lands, exercise tribal rights, and protect tribal trust resources. 10 3 Similar to the executive orders before and after it, SO 3206
explicitly states that it is only for internal guidance and that it does
not create any legally enforceable rights.1 0 4 One interesting difference is that SO 3206 also "shall not be construed to ...diminish
any legally enforceable rights . . . [or]
to alter, amend, repeal,
10 5

interpret or modify tribal sovereignty."'
Secretarial Order 3206 was hailed as a new beginning for
federal and tribal government- to-government relationships. Many
believed that it would be a vehicle for meaningful consultation
between tribes and the Departments and would support tribal°6
sovereignty in regards to the effect of the ESA on Indian lands.'
Charles Wilkinson felt that the workshop was the "most informed
and comprehensive discussion of natural resources issues" he had
ever attended, and that SO 3206 served as a major example of how
the government-to-government relationship between the 07
United
States and Indian tribes could be successfully implemented. 1
I3d.at §§ 4, 5(3)(A).
Id. at § 2(A),(B).

104

"05 Id.at § 2(B).
106

See e.g., Suagee, supra note 4, at 520 (explaining that SO 3206 is example of

how bilateral negotiations between tribes and federal government can yield
national policy harmonizing rights and interests of tribes with policies of
national legislation).
107Charles Wilkinson, The Role Of Bilateralism In Fulfilling The Federal-Tribal
Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72
WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (1997). Wilkinson attended the Seattle meeting and
participated in the negotiation sessions between the tribes and the Departments
of Interior and Commerce.
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The foundation of SO 3206, the Seattle meeting and
follow-up working group, is a good example of the Cornell/Kalt
theory of nation building in action. The six steps to action that can
lead to the nation building or "just do it" approach include that the
tribe identify the problem, realize that things can be different,
decide that it is up to them to change things, believe that it can fix
the problem, come up with a solution, and make it happen.' 0 8 At
the meeting the tribes took a stand on the ESA, proactively drafted
an initiative, and presented it to the federal government. In this de
facto exercise of sovereignty, the tribes were able to craft an order
together with the Departments that strives to harmonize the
"federal trust responsibility to tribes, 0tribal
sovereignty and the
9
Departments."'
the
of
statutory missions
The literature indicates that SO 3206 had great potential for
improving government-to-government relationships between tribes
and federal agencies and of giving tribes greater control and
management authority over endangered and threatened species
found on Indian lands. In reality, did SO 3206 do so? According
to Zellmer, the effectiveness of SO 3206 depends, in large part, on
the extent to which the Departments' underlying agencies engage
in meaningful consultation with tribes." 0 SO 3206 repeatedly
states that the Departments and their agencies are to engage in
meaningful communication and consultation with Indian tribes
and, in order to fulfill the agencies' trust responsibilities,
encourage meaningful tribal participation. The question becomes:
What does "meaningful" mean?
B.
"Meaningful" Communication, Consultation, and
Participation
The seminal fishing rights case of Sohappy v. Smith was the
first to include language of meaningful participation by Indian
tribes in the management of the environmental resources on which
their cultures depended. In this case the Oregon district court
108

Cornell, Jorgensen, Kalt, & Spilde, supra note 14, at 13-15.

109

SO 3206, supra note 100, § 5

110

Sandi B. Zellmer, Conserving Ecosystems Through the SecretarialOrder on

Tribal Rights, 14 NAT.

RESOURCES

& ENV'T 162, 214 (2000).
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encouraged the state and the tribes to pursue a "cooperative
approach" to the management of Oregon fisheries."' While refusing to dictate specific procedures which the state must follow in
adopting regulations applicable to Indian fisheries, the court
reminded the state that it must recognize that "the federal right
which the Indians have is distinct from the fishing rights of others
[and] tribal entities are interested parties to any regulation affecting
the treaty fishing right." ' 1 2 The court held that tribes were entitled
to be heard on the subject and are to be given appropriate notice
and opportunity to participate meaningfully in the rule-making
process. 13 While the Sohappy decision is significant, meaningful
tribal participation in the federal agency process has yet to be
specifically defined. Since the Sohappy case courts have been
forced to attempt to do so.
In 1979, the Eight Circuit found that Bureau of Indian
Affairs ("BIA") failure to consult with the Oglala Sioux tribe
before making a decision to reassign the Indian Superintendent
violated its trust responsibility to the tribe as well as its own
internal guidelines for consultation. 1 4 The court stated that two
meetings of tribal delegates with Washington officials did not
fulfill the requirement of "meaningful consultation" with tribal
governing bodies as contemplated by the guidelines. 1 5 The court
held that where the BIA had established a policy requiring prior
consultation with a tribe, it created a "justified expectation" on the
part of the Indian people that they will be given a meaningful
6
opportunity to express their views before BIA policy is made."I
In antithesis to the Oglala Sioux holding, in 1987 the Ninth
Circuit rejected the Northern California district court's
acknowledgment of a tribal right to consultation when the Hoopa

111 Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 912 (D. Or. 1969).
112Id.at 911-12.

(emphasis added).
Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 720-21 (8th Cir.

113Id.at 912

114Oglala

1979).
"

Id. at 720.

1161d. at

721.
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Valley Tribe brought an action seeking to enjoin the BIA from
1 17
moving its offices off the reservation:
The [Guidelines] . . . are not conceded by the

Bureau to have the force of law, in contrast to the
governmental concession made in Oglala Sioux
Tribe v. Andrus. Nor are these Guidelines the same
as regulations that must be applied because "the
rights of individuals are affected." The Guidelines
are in letter form and unpublished ...[and] call for

consultation where major moves affect the Indians.
They give direction to the Bureau. They do not
establish legal standards
that can be enforced
8
Bureau."
the
against
The Ninth Circuit held that even if the guidelines had
binding effect the BIA had substantially complied, and defined
consultation as "not the same as obeying those who are consulted.
The Hupas [sic] were heard, even though their advice was not
accepted."" 19 .
In Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer the district court found
that the BIA was required to consult with the tribe prior to
reducing BIA employees on the reservation. The court held that
normally federal agencies could downsize without consultation,
but that the BIA was unlike any other federal agency, and that
"reducing the number of employees may not be accomplished
without meaningful prior consultation with the tribes."' 120 The
court noted that this did not mean that the BIA must obey those
who are consulted or accept their advice.' 2' The court held that the
Clinton Memorandum did not create any enforceable duty and was
intended primarily as a political tool for implementing the
President's personal Indian affairs policy and not as a legal
117Hoopa

Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1986) (amended

Mar. 13, 1987).
118Id. at 1103
119
120 Ld.
Lower
121

id.

Brute Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.S.D. 1995).
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framework enforceable by private civil action. 22
The
Memorandum did, however, serve as further evidence of BIA
policy, the interpretation of BIA policy by the BIA
and by the
23
thereon.'
reliance
tribe's
the
and
government,
federal
The Lower Brule Sioux decision went further than any
previous court in defining the concept of consultation. Meaningful
consultation, the court stated, "means tribal consultation in
advance with the decision maker or with intermediaries with clear
authority to present tribal views to the BIA decision maker. The
decision maker is to comply with BIA and administration
policies.' 24 The court held that the BIA could not disavow its
own policies and directives.125 It "could easily at any time have
narrowed or eliminated guidelines, memorandums, directives,
policies and promises of meaningful126consultation [and] did not do
so, even after Oglala was decided."'
In other words, as the cases above suggest, a duty to
meaningfully consult does not exist unless the federal agency
decides it does. In promulgating guidelines such as SO 3206,
federal agencies open the door to judicial interpretation of whether
they have "substantially complied" with their own policies,
however these agencies have considerable discretion in deciding
what those guidelines will be.
To date only one case has held that the trust obligation to
protect treaty resources includes consultation requirements. In
Klamath Tribes v. United States, the district court expressly
recognized a procedural duty arising from the trust relationship
that required the federal government to consult with Indian tribes
in the decision-making process to avoid adverse effects on treaty
resources.127 The district court held that the federal government
had a substantive duty to protect "to the fullest extent possible" the
tribes' treaty rights, and the resources on which those rights
122 id.
123 id.
124 Id.

125 Id. at

400.

Id. at 400.
127Klamath Tribes v. United States, No. 96-381-HA, 1996 WL 924509 at *8 (D.
Or. Oct. 2, 1996).
126
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28
depend.1
The court enjoined logging that would affect wildlife
resources within the tribes' former reservation until the federal
government ensured, in consultation with the Klamath Tribes on a
government-to-government basis, that the resources on which the
tribes' treaty rights depend would be protected. 2 9
Zellmer holds that where federal activities affect trust
resources tribes should be entitled to greater involvement than the
due process rights afforded non-Indians. 130 Unless agency discretion is restrained by specific legal standards, "a right to consult
may, in fact, be less than meaningful."' 13 1 For government-togovernment consultation to have meaning, tribes must be decisionmakers in the process. 132 They must be viewed not merely as
commentators, but as sovereign governments with power-sharing
capacity.' 33 It has been ten years since the issuance of SO 3206,
and it does not appear that it has yet lived up to its full promise of
true bilateralism between the United States and sovereign tribal
governments. This is supported by the fact that in final rule
designations of critical habitat under the ESA involving tribal
lands between the signing of the order in June 1997 and January
34
2006, almost half included these lands.'
Closer examinations of the designations, however, show
that SO 3206 is making a difference. The difference does not seem
to result from the Departments carrying out federal Indian policy
by fulfilling their fiduciary responsibility to Indian tribes to protect
their lands and resources, or even because they are following SO
3206 guidelines.' 35 Instead, tribes are taking the conservation of

Id. (citing Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C.
1973)).
128

129

Id. at *9.

Zellmer, supra note 45, at 389-90.
at 390.
132 Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitatfor Off-Reservation
Tribal Hunting and
FishingRights: Tribal Co-Managementas a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. L. 279,
130

131Id

303 (2000).
133Id at 303.
134See

Marren Sanders, Implementing the Federal EndangeredSpecies Act in
Indian Country:
The Promise and Reality of Secretarial Order 3206, 2007-01, JOINT
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON NATIVE AFF. 37
135Id.at 37.
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protected species into their own hands and creating and
implementing habitat management plans that are being accepted by
the Departments as an alternative to the designation of critical
habitat on Indian lands.' 36 By taking conservation of endangered
species on Indian lands into their own hands and having the necessary strategic institutions in place to implement habitat management, tribes are practicing the de facto sovereignty that leads to
Nation building.
VII.

THE NATION BUILDING APPROACH

Professional public relations will not cure problems
of racism and disrespect for Native nationhood....
[P]lanting the seeds of recognition of the economic
importance, social presence, and nationhood status
of the Native nations promotes the sense that the
nation is for real

..

. [B]eing treated like a nation

requires acting like a nation...

137

For the last two decades the Harvard Project on American
Indian Economic Development at Harvard University ("Harvard
Project,") recently joined by the Native Nations Institute for
Leadership, Management, and Policy at the University of Arizona
("NNI,") has conducted research regarding economic development
in Indian Country. Over the years these institutions have developed
what they call the "nation building approach" to economic
development on Indian reservations. 38 As explained by Stephen
Cornell of NNI, in nation building what really matters are not only
tribal government rights and powers but the ability to put those
productive ways with the
rights and powers to work in effective,
139
governed.
being
people
the
of
support
Officials at the Harvard Project and NNI believe that nation
building is far more likely to produce a sustainable future for
Indian nations because as these nations reclaim power over their
136

See Id.at 37-38.

137Cornell,
138Cornell

Jorgensen, Kalt, & Spilde, supra note 14, at 31.
& Kalt, supra note 75, at. 11.

Cornell, supra note at 17, at 14.

139
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own affairs they dramatically improve economic and community
welfare. 140 By rebuilding their institutional capacity for effective
self-governance and reorganizing relationships with other
governments, Indian nations reduce dependence on the federal
government and strengthen tribal sovereignty. 141 Tribes achieve
self-determination by acting, thinking, being, and relating as
independent, self-governing nations, regardless of whether they are
recognized as such by outsiders. 142 According to Kalt and Singer,
tribes possess three types of sovereignty. "De recto" sovereignty is
sovereignty by moral principal or right.143 "De jure" sovereignty is
given by legal decree or legislative act. 144 "De facto" sovereignty,
the type
which appears to be most suited to a tribe's ability to self45
rule. 1
A.

De Facto Sovereignty

Stephen Comell and Joseph P. Kalt hold that tribal sover146
eignty is crucial to successful development by Indian nations.
The "self-determination" policy of the 1970s, they note, opened
147
the door for tribes to assert the sovereignty promised by law.
"De facto" sovereignty, sovereignty in practice, means that Indian
nations have genuine decision-making control over their own
futures, including the use of tribal resources. 148 In over two
decades of research, the Harvard Project and NNI found that in
every case of sustained economic development on Indian
reservations, the primary economic decisions were being made by
140

Stephen Cornell & Joseph Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building:

The

Development Challenge in Indian Country Today, 22 AMERICAN INDIAN
CULTURE AND RESEARCH JOURNAL,
141

Id. at 191

193 (1998).

142JOSEPH P. KALT, HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., POLICY
FOUND. FOR THE FUTURE OF THE NATION BLDG IN INDIAN COUNTRY

143 Kalt & Singer, supra note 15.

2 (2001).

144 Id.
145 Id.

146

Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the

Chances for Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, 200302, JOINT OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON NATIVE AFF. 15

"41 Cornell & Kalt, supra note 140, at 188.
148 Cornell & Kalt, supra note 146, at 15.
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the tribe, not by outsiders. 149 Outside agencies had moved from
being the controlling influence in decisions to the role of advisor or
provider of technical assistance.' 50 Cornell and Kalt found that
two factors more than any others distinguished successful tribes
from unsuccessful ones:
de facto sovereignty and effective
institutions of self-governance.' 5'
B.

Effective Institutions

Cornell and Kalt argue that federal Indian policy has
created dependency among Indian nations, such that tribes have
had to rely on "someone else's institutions, someone else's rules,
[and] someone else's models, to get things done."' 152 Harvard
Project research has revealed that the following characteristics are
shared by effective governing institutions on Indian reservations:
1.

Stable institutions and policies. These include formal and
informal but established practices that dictate how a tribe
relates to its members and to outsiders, how rights and
powers are distributed, and the rules by which all of the
above operate. 153 Formal policies can include constitutions,
codes, and procedures. Informal practices are usually
determined by the specific tribe's cultural standards of what
54
is right, what is wrong, and how things should be done.'

2.

Fair and effective dispute resolution. Most often this is
reflected by a strong and independent tribal judicial
system. 155 Tribal governing institutions must show that
claims and disputes, including disputes with the tribe itself,
will be fairly dealt with and that they 56
have an effective and
system.'
resolution
dispute
responsive

149 id.

150Id.
151 id.
152
153
54

1

Cornell& Kalt, supra note 140, at 195-96.
Cornell &Kalt, supra note 146, at 17.
id.

155Cornell
156

& Kalt, supra note 140, 197.
Cornell & Kalt, supra note 140, at 197.
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3.

Separation of politics from business management. Harvard
Project research has shown that when business decisions
are made according to political agendas or pressures tribal
businesses typically either fail or become a drain on tribal
resources, preventing57 those resources from being used to
their full advantage.1

4.

A competent bureaucracy. According to Cornell and Kalt,
one of the key elements for success is management that
gets the job done and done well. 158 A capable bureaucracy
can enable a tribe to assert control
over natural resources
59
1
them.
affect
that
areas
other
and

5.

Cultural match.
Governing institutions must match
community views about how authority should be organized
and exercised.160 Without it, tribal government can lack
legitimacy with the people it is supposed to govern.'61

C.

Cultural Match

Harvard Project research revealed that tribal governing
institutions were more productive and effective when they fit with
the tribe's cultural norms and understandings.' 62 When cultural
match is high, these institutions are more likely to be respected and
supported by the people they govern. 63 When cultural match is
low, the institutions are often viewed as "toothless [and are]
ignored, disrespected, and/or turned into vehicles for personal
enrichment."' 64 Cornell and Kalt warn, however, that cultural
match does not necessarily mean traditional, pre-European contact

157Cornell & Kalt, supranote 146, at 33.
158 Cornell
159

160

& Kalt, supranote 140, at 201.

Id.

Cornell & Kalt, supra note 146, at 18.

161 Id.

162

Cornell, supra note 17, at 4.

163Cornell

164id

& Kalt, supranote 140, at 202.
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governing systems. 165 Like any community, tribal societies, their
cultures, and their governments change over time. The key,
Cornell and Kalt state, is that tribal governing institutions must not
only be effective in the here and now, but must also fit the
society's view of what is appropriate and fair.' 66 Unless there is a
match between the tribe's culture and its institutions, tribal
develop strategic, long-term solutions to the
government cannot
67
tribe's problems. 1
Strategic Orientation

D.

The final factor that the Harvard Project research discovered to be critical to a tribe's ability to build a nation is
strategic orientation. The key questions a tribe must ask are
"[W]hat kind of society are we trying to build for the long term,"
and "[W]hat decisions should we be making now in support of that
objective?"' 168 According to Cornell and Kalt, a tribe must change
its thinking from reactive to proactive, from short-term crisis
management to long-term sustainable solutions. 69 In the case
studies that follow, tribes took on the challenge of the nation
building approach as they attempted to assert control, build capable
governing institutions, think strategically, create policies, and
choose and implement co-management projects that supported
their strategic objectives.
VIII.

A.

CASE STUDIES

Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission
The sacred salmon runs are in decline. It is the
moral duty, therefore, of the Indian people of the

165

Id.at 205.

166 id.

Cornell & Kalt, supra note 146, at 9.
Cornell, Jorgensen, Kalt, & Spilde, supra note 14, at 5.
169 Cornell & Kalt, supra note 75, at 17.
167
168
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Columbia River to see them restored... We have 70
to
take care of them so that they can take care of us. 1
"Columbia River salmon stocks are extremely important
for cultural tribal ceremonies, subsistence, and commercial fisheries [of the Northwest tribes].' 17 1 The annual First Salmon Feast
thanks the Creator for the blessing of salmon, thanks the salmon
for offering themselves as food for the tribes, and tribe members
show respect for the salmon's sacrifices.' 72 Fishing season cannot
start until the feast has been held and the bones of the first salmon
are returned to the river. 173 The community honored the catch for
"[o]ne of our relatives has returned, and we consider the lives we
take to care for our communities."'1 74 The Columbia River tribes
are salmon people-Wy-Kan-Ush-Pum-and salmon are a defining
75
aspect of their spiritual and cultural identity.1
As Euro-American settlers spread westward, competition
for the abundant salmon resource of the Northwest increased,
habitat diminished, and the tribes were soon faced with the military
might of the United States. When tribal and U.S. government
leaders met at the Walla Walla treaty grounds in 1855, Washington
territorial governor Isaac Stevens reportedly said, "If [tribes]
refused to sell, soldiers would be sent to wipe them off the
earth."' 176 In less than a month, over 64 million acres of the
170

Statement by Ted Strong, Former Director of the Columbia River Inter-Tribal

Fish Commission, available at http://www.critfc.org/text/trp.html.
171 TribalSuccesses under the Pacific CoastalSalmon Recovery Fund (FY 2000-

2005), http://www.critfc.org/text/pcsrf/pcsrf.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
171

CRITFC, Why Salmon are Important, http://www.critfc.org/sots/salmon_

import.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).

173Andrew H. Fisher, Tangled Nets Treaty Rights and Tribal Identities at Celilo
Falls, 105 Or. Hist. Q. 178, fig. 7 (2004) available at http://www.history

cooperative.org/joumals/ohq/1 05.2/fisher.html.
174 Elizabeth

Woody, Recalling Celilo, http://www.salmonnation.com/essays/

recallingcelilo.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
115

See CRITFC, What is Wy-Kan-Ush-Pum?, http://www.critfc.org/sots/

wkupmeaning.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007); See also CRITFC, The
Importance of Salmon to the Tribes, at http://www.critfc.org/text/saimcult.html

(last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
176

A.J.

SPLAWN, KA-MI-AKIN, THE LAST HERO OF THE YAKIMAS,

Stationery & Printing Co., 1917).

34, (Kilham
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Columbia River Basin had been ceded to the United States in four
treaties, while tribes reserved for themselves only small areas of
land and177the right "of taking fish.., in common with" the new
settlers.

Despite ratified treaties, conflicts between Indian and nonIndian over the rich resources of the Columbia River Basin escalated, leading ultimately to the 1905 Supreme Court decision,
UnitedStates v. Winans.178 The Celilo Fish Committee ("Committee") derived from the sovereign powers of the people living and
fishing in the nearby tribal territories, exercised authority over
tribal harvest at Celilo Falls from 1935 until the falls were flooded
by The Dalles Dam in 1957.179 The Committee oversaw tribal
fishing practices that were disciplined and designed to ensure that
the salmon
resource would flourish and continue to exist in the
80
future.
Notwithstanding earlier Supreme Court affirmation, by
1968 tribal rights to take salmon and steelhead were seriously
jeopardized by multiple factors, including environmental degradation, hydroelectric projects, non-Indian over fishing, and state
regulation. Average annual runs of salmon stocks returning to the
See Treaty with the Middle Tribes of Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963;
Treaty with the Nez Perces, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty with the Walla
Walla, Cayuse and Umatilla, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty with the
Yakama, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951; See also Michael C. Blumm, The
Amphibious Salmon: The Evolution of Ecosystem Management in the Columbia
River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653, 656 (1997).
178 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (holding treaties are not a grant of
rights to Indians, but
rather an implied reservation of those rights and powers not granted). In this
ground breaking case, the Court upheld the right of the Columbia River tribes to
access their "usual and accustomed" fishing places, a right described by Justice
McKenna as "not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the
atmosphere they breathed." Id. at 38 1.
179 See CRITFC, What is CRITFC, http://www.critfc.org/text/work.html (last
visited Nov. 11, 2007); see also Andrew H. Fisher, Tangled Nets, Treaty Rights,
and Tribal Identities at Celilo Falls, 105 OR. HIST. Q. 178 (Summer 2004).
SOSee CRITFC, supra note 179;see also Mary Christina Wood, The Politics of
Abundance: Towards a Future of Tribal-State Relations, 83 OR. L. REV. 1331,
1336 (2004) (stating committee calculated runs, allocated harvest between
tribes, and determined escape required for adequate spawning and even during
times of starvation, tribal leaders would not allow more harvest than resource
could sustain).
177
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Columbia River watershed, estimated at 5-16 million fish
historically, had declined by over ninety percent.'18 Over the next
twenty years multiple court orders affirmed and defined the tribes'
82
treaty reserved fishing rights in the Columbia River Basin.1
While the Sohappy v. Smith decision was considered a victory,
some Pacific Northwest tribes saw problems because it opened the

door to state regulation of treaty reserved resources. 8 3 Judge
Belloni's decision encouraged the state and the tribes to pursue a

"cooperative approach" to the management of Oregon fisheries,

concluding that tribes were entitled to notice and opportunity to
meaningfully participate in the rule-making process.' 84
Five years later, Judge Boldt in United States v. Washington held that tribes were entitled to exercise their governmental
powers by regulating the treaty right fishing of their members as
long as the tribes accepted listed conditions and maintained certain
qualifications. 8 5 Tribes now faced the daunting responsibilities of
181 CRITFC

Tribal Successes under the Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Fund

(FY 2000-2005), http://www.critfc.org/text/pcsrf/pcsrf.html (last visited Nov.
12, 2007); see also Suagee, supra note 4, at 516.
182 See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (securing tribes' right to harvest up to fifty percent
of harvestable fish subject to amount necessary to meet moderate living needs);
United States v. Oregon, 529 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976) (upholding tribes' right to
fifty percent of Chinook harvest); Sohappy v. Smith/United States v. Oregon,
302 F. Supp. 899 (D.Or. 1969) (stating treaties entitled Indians to fair share of
fish resources at all usual and accustomed places and allowing state limitations
on rights only where necessary for conservation purposes); United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (stating tribes entitled to
regulate treaty right fishing of members exclusive of state provided tribe
maintained specified qualifications and conditions).
183 See Laura Berg, Let Them Do As They Have Promised,3 Hastings W.-N.W.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 7, 17 (1995) (statement by former Yakima tribal attorney
James B. Hovis) ( "The only thing I regretted was that [the court] said the state
had the right to regulate.").
184 Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 912. (D. Or. 1969).
185 United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 340 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
These qualifications included responsible and competent leadership, a well
organized tribal government that was able to promulgate and enforce
regulations, trained Indian personnel, and the availability of experts in fishery
science and management. Id. at 340-41. To prove their capability, tribes would
be required to provide for full and complete tribal fishing regulations, to permit
monitoring of off-reservation fishing, and to provide fish catch reports. Id. at
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fisheries management and self-regulation, tasks which some
Columbia River tribes were well versed in but for which others
86
lacked the necessary staff or internal procedures to handle.
There was also the very real feeling that the exclusion of state
regulation was unlikely because non-Indian practices had already
created the conservation conditions, which were articulated by
Judge Belloni in the Sohappy case.1 87 In 1974, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Yakama Nation had met the requisite conditions and
qualifications, but the court stressed that the Yakama's power to
"meaningful only when combined with the power to
regulate was
88
enforce." 1
In response to these legal decisions and to protect their
treaty-reserved rights and sacred salmon heritage, the four Columbia River treaty tribes (Warm Springs, Yakama, Umatilla, and Nez
Perce) joined together in the manner of the old Celilo Fish
Committee to renew their authority in fisheries management.' 89 In
1977, the tribes formed the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission ("CRITFC") to provide fishery coordination, technical assistance, and organize inter-tribal representation in regional

341. Judge Boldt also held that states could regulate off-reservation tribal
fishing at usual and accustomed fishing grounds in situations where the tribes
had not satisfied the specified qualifications and conditions to regulate their own
fishery. Id. at 401-402.
186 Berg, supra note 183, at 17.
187 Wood, supra note 24, at 26-27; See also, Berg, supra note 183, at 17. Judge
Belloni held that states were permitted to regulate the exercise of tribal reserved
rights if the resources at issue were in jeopardy and it was necessary in the
interests of conservation to do so. Sohappy, supra note 182, at 911-12..
188 Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 238 (9th Cir. 1974).
CRITFC supra note 179. The governing body of the CRITFC is
189 See
comprised of the Fish and Wildlife Committees of the Nez Perce Tribe, the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated
Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, and the Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation. See CRTIF, CRTIF Commissioners,
http://www.critfc.org/text/commissioner.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). The
four committees must reach consensus in order for the commission to act. Id.
All of the CRITFC tribes have Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) government
structures. See id. (links to CRTIFC member websites); See also Tribal
Constitutions, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/constitutions.htm (last visited
Nov. 17, 2007).
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planning, policy, and decision-making. 9 ' The CRITFC, while
supporting the tribes' joint and individual exercise of sovereign
authority, works to restore healthy, sustainable salmon and other
fish populations throughout the Columbia River Basin. 191
In 1980, Congress passed the Northwest Power Act, which
had the express goal of balancing hydroelectric operations and fish
and wildlife protection goals.' 92 While advocates were optimistic
that salmon would recover under the Act, it did little to change
river operations or halt salmon decline.' 9 3 By the mid-1980s, the
ESA listed several salmon stocks as threatened or endangered
under the ESA and more
than 100 runs of salmon in the Basin had
94
extinct.'
gone
already
As conflicts over salmon management continued, Judge
Belloni presided over negotiations between CRITFC, the states of
Oregon and Washington, and the federal government that
culminated in the 1988 Columbia River Fish Management Plan
("Plan"). 195 According to Wood, natural resource law professors
from across the country looked to the plan as a model of comanagement between states and tribes,196 but was it an exercise in
nation building? Did the agreement result in the tribes reclaiming
power over their own affairs and rebuilding
their institutional
97
capacity for effective self-governance?
A.

The 1988 Columbia River Fish Management Plan

The preamble of the Columbia River Fish Management
Plan states that the purpose of the ten year plan was to "provide a
190 See CRTIFC, supra note 179.

'9'
See CRTIFC supra note 181.
192 16 U.S.C. § 839 (2007).
193

194

Wood, supra note 24, at 20.
See Nationa Water Resource

Association,

ESA

Salmon

Listings,

http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/ESA-Salmon-Listings/Index.cfn (last visited Nov. 12,
2004); see also Mary Christina Wood, supra note 24, at 20 (citing Joan Laatz
Jewett and Brian T. Meehan, River of Ghosts: A Special Report, SUNDAY
OREGONIAN, Oct. 29, 1995 at SI).
195 The Plan was amended and approved by the court in 1988. United States
v.
Oregon, 699 F. Supp. 1456 (D.Or. 1988).
196 Wood, supra note 180, at
1339.
197 Cornell, Jorgensen, Kalt, & Spilde, supra note 14, at 7.
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framework within which the Parties may exercise their sovereign
powers in a coordinated and systematic manner in order to protect,
rebuild, and enhance upper Columbia River fish runs while provi198
ding harvests for both treaty Indian and non-Indian fisheries.
The Plan established Technical, Production, and Policy
Committees, all of which included representatives from each of the
tribes and from federal and state agencies. 199 If the Committees
were unable to resolve disputes among the parties, jurisdiction
remained with the federal courts, pursuant to United States v.
Oregon. °°
The essence of the Plan's co-management responsibilities
lay in section IV(E), entitled "Regulation of Mainstem Treaty
Indian Fisheries." The purpose of this section was to "promote
effective tribal/state co-management and facilitate enforcement by
ensuring compatibility of tribal and state law.",20 1 Notice and
response requirements were built into the Plan for all new state or
tribal regulations. If the tribes or states did not respond within the
proscribed time period, the proposing party had the option to adopt
the regulation(s) without change.2 °2 The tribes and states were to
203
"make every 64
effort to agree" on seasonal regulations.
Interestingly, whether or not the notice and response scheme detailed
above occurred, the tribes were to enact permanent and seasonal
regulations regarding the fisheries and any tribal regulation which
were inconsistent with state regulations would be "deemed notice

198
Columbia River Fish Management Plan, Preamble (as amended by the Court
Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
199 Columbia River Fish Management Plan, §§ IV(A), IV(B), IV(C) (as amended
by the Court Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
200 Columbia River Fish Management Plan, §§ I(C), IV(D) (as amended
by the
Court Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author) (referring to United States v. Oregon,
699 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Or. 1988)).
201 Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § IV(E)(I). (as amended
by the
Court Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
202 Columbia River Fish Management Plan, §§ IV(E)(2)(c), IV(E)(2)(d)
(as
amended by the Court Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
203 Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § IV(E)(3) (as amended by the
Court
Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
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of tribal disagreement with the inconsistent provisions of the state
regulations. 20 4
The tribes, Oregon, Washington, and the United States
agreed that the tribes would "bear primary responsibility for
enforcing agreed upon seasonal and permanent regulations" applicable to the fisheries. 205 The tribes agreed to commit, to the
maximum extent possible, the police, prosecutorial, and judicial
20 6
resources necessary to ensure compliance with tribal regulations.

Oregon, Washington, and the United States, however, only agreed
to negotiate agreements with each tribe whereby tribal fishermen
cited by state or federal enforcement officials would be referred to

the tribes for prosecution. 20 7 The parties agreed that cases referred
to tribal court would not be prosecuted in state court, unless no
tribal court charges were filed.20 8 The final section of the Plan
states that nothing in the agreement "is intended to or shall be
interpreted to limit any tribe's right to seek from the Court ...selfto those
regulatory status pursuant to standards . . .' comparable
20 9
identified.., in United States v. Washington."

On the surface, the Columbia River Fish Management Plan
seems to uphold only "de jure" sovereignty, that is, sovereignty as
enunciated by the courts and federal law. Under the Marshall

Trilogy and subsequent case law and legislation, tribal governments do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians and the Plan
clearly states that the treaty tribes may prosecute only tribal
fishermen who are cited for violating fishery regulations. 210 The
204

Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § IV(E)(4) (as amended by the Court

Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § IV(E)(5)(a) (as amended by the

205

Court Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § IV(E)(5)(b) (as amended by the

206

Court Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § IV(E)(5)(c) (as amended by the

207

Court Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
208 Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § IV(E)(4)(c) (as amended by the
Court Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
209 Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § IV(E)(8) (as amended by the Court
Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
210 See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding
no jurisdiction over non-Indians who committed crimes against Indians on
reservation land); See also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004)
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Plan also states that tribal harvest must be compatible with
conservation requirements and is subject to the rights of nonIndian fishermen under state and federal law.2 1' Finally, the Plan
affirms federal supremacy by stating that it cannot be construed as
imposing a legal obligation on any federal agency to "act in a
manner in conflict with212 applicable federal laws, regulations,
procedures and policies."
On closer inspection, however, could this agreement be an
exercise in nation building? Cornell and Kalt write that the nation
building approach has five primary characteristics. These include
comprehensive assertions of sovereignty or self-rule, backing up
sovereignty with effective governing institutions, matching those
institutions to indigenous political culture, strategic orientation,
and leadership dedicated to nation building.21 3 The Northwest
tribes have always asserted their rights to manage the salmon as a
sustainable natural resource critical to their cultural way of life. It
was not until the 1960s with the Sohappy case that the courts began
to recognize these rights.
With the creation of the CRITFC, the tribes backed up their
court recognized rights with a technically savvy institution
dedicated to the protection of those rights and the restoration of
healthy, sustainable salmon populations throughout the Columbia
River Basin. 214 Based on the old Celilo Fish Committee, this
institution matched the tribes' political culture of using their joint
and individual exercise of sovereign authority in unity of action in
service of the salmon. The CRTIFC Constitution recognizes that
(upholding tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indian who committed crime on
reservation land).
211Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § l(B)(2)(as amended by the Court
Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
212

Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § 1(B)(7) (as amended by the Court

Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
213 Cornell & Kalt, supra note 75, at 11.
214 CRITFC employs a professional staff including lawyers, biologists, hydrologists, and public relations specialists to provide expert support for programs
including fisheries management, fisheries science, policy development and
litigation support, fish marketing, and watershed restoration. The Harvard
Project on American Indian Economic Development, Honoring Nations (2002),
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, http://www.ksg.harvard.edul/
hpaied/hn/hn_2002_fish.htm.
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fisheries "are a basic and important natural resource of vital concern to the Indians of these states" and that their conservation
resource "is dependent upon effective and progressive manage'
ment."215
CRITFC is composed of the fish and wildlife committees from its member tribes and operates by consensus, with
each of the four member tribes entitled to a single vote, offering a
unified voice in the overall management of Columbia River Basin
fishery resources. 216 As part of their strategic implementation, the
tribes repeatedly approached state and federal governments to
assert their rights and to work on behalf of salmon and steelhead
restoration. 217 The Plan includes statements reflecting the goals of
management for "present and future generations," and specifically
addresses ceremonial and subsistence entitlements.218
There are aspects of the Columbia River Fish Management
Plan that, arguably, could serve as motivation for tribes to engage
in nation building and to create capable institutions to uphold their
end of the bargain. For example, the tribes could enact and enforce
fisheries regulations and agree to commit the police, prosecutorial,
and judicial resources necessary to ensure compliance with tribal
regulations.2 19 To be successful, the tribes would have to have in
place the mechanisms to do so. The Plan in and of itself, however,
is a reflection of de jure sovereignty, a recognition of rights given
by law. The steps the Columbia River tribes took to arrive at the
table put itself in the position to negotiate the Plan which is an
exercise in de facto sovereignty necessary for nation building.
By resurrecting the Celilo Fish Committee, the Columbia
River treaty tribes acting individually and through the CRITFC,
engaged in a process to lead "a comprehensive effort to restore
salmon for the benefit of its member tribes and all people of the
215

CRTIFC,

CRTIFC

Constitution

and

Bylaws,

http://www.critfc.org/

text/commissioner.html (last visited Jan. 08, 2008).
216
217

See id.
See United States v. Oregon, 699 F.Supp. 1456 (D. Or. 1988) (detailing tribes

repeated attempt to work out government-to-government management plans
with Oregon, Washington, and the United States).
218 Columbia River Fish Management Plan, § II(A) (as amended by the Court
Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
219 Columbia River Fish Management Plan, §§
IV(E)(4), IV(E)(5)(a), (as
amended by the Court Oct. 7, 1988) (on file with author).
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Pacific Northwest. ' 220 The leadership of the CRITFC, which
includes a professional staff of lawyers, biologists, hydrologists,
and public relations specialists, have worked to restore and manage
a sacred resource, protect the exercise of Indian treaty rights, and
to raise awareness about and confidence in the ability of Indian
nations to self-govern. 22 1 By developing leading technical
expertise on natural resource issues in the Columbia River Basin,
the CRITFC can gain the respect of state and federal agencies as
well as the non-Indian public. The CRITFC helped put its member
tribes in a position of strength, allowing them to effectively
support and advance their rights to self-government, leading
ultimately to the tribes' development of their own Columbia River
salmon recovery plan in 1994, Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi Wa-Kish-Wit:
Spirit of the Salmon.
B.
Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi Wa-Kish-Wit (Spirit of the
Salmon)
"The salmon ... are a gift from the Creator that we must
preserve, protect and enhance, passing them down as we found
them from generation to generation. To do otherwise... would be
a disgrace to ourselves and an insult to our children". 222
"The Endangered Species Act does not mandate recovery,
it mandates a recovery plan. That's different from recovery. "223
While the 1988 Columbia River Fish Management Plan
was praised by some as a model of administrative coordination and
cooperation among states and tribes in wildlife and harvest

220

The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, supra note

214.
221 id.

Wood, supra note 24, at I, n. 326 (quoting William H. Burke, Chief,
Umatilla Tribe).

222

Rebecca Clarren, Dams Will Stand, Salmon Be Damned, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Oct. 11, 2004 http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article-id=15043
223

(quoting NOAA Fisheries spokesman, Brian Gorman).
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management 224 the base reality was that, despite the Plan, salmon
numbers continued to decline.
In 1991 Sockeye salmon and spring, summer, and fall
Chinook from the Snake River, the Columbia's largest tributary,
were listed under the ESA.2 25 In the spring of 1994 Chinook runs
in the Columbia River collapsed to record lOWS. 226 Tribes were
unable to meet even ceremonial needs and conflicts between
Indian and non-Indian fishermen not seen since the "fish wars" of
the 1970s began again.2 27 State and tribal officials eventually were
able to come to an agreement allowing ceremonial fishing,228 but it
was more clear than ever that the tribes would need to "just do it"
and take salmon restoration into their own hands. Taking on the
challenge, in 1994 the tribes developed their own Columbia River
salmon plan, Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi Wa-Kish-Wit:
Spirit of the
Salmon. While not a co-management plan involving federal or
state agencies, the significance of this exercise in de facto
sovereignty and nation building merits closer analysis.
Blending up-to-date science with the wisdom and history of
the tribes, Spirit of the Salmon is designed to restore fisheries in
the Columbia River Basin by promoting "gravel to gravel"
management. 229 This holistic approach recognizes the relationship
between anadromous fish, human pressures on them, and the
condition of their environment and focuses on the tributary,
mainstem, estuary, and ocean ecosystems and habitats where fish
live throughout their life cycle. 230 The recommendations in Spirit

224

See Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Fishing

Rights of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 375, 406-07 (1991); see
also Wood, supra note 30, at 431.
225 See ESA Salmon Listings, http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/ESA-Salmon-Listings/
Index.cfn (last visited Jan. 08, 2008) (follow "Chinock" hyperlink; or follow
"Sockeye" hyperlink).
226 See A Short Chronology of Treaty Fishing on the Columbia River,
http://www.critfc.org/text/timeline4.html (last visited Jan. 08, 2008).
227 Wood, supra note 180, at 1340.
228
Id. at1341.
229 CRITFC, Science, http://www.critfc.org/text/science.html (last visited Nov.
6, 2007).
230 Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi Wa-Kish-Wit, Spirit of the Salmon, The Columbia River
Anadromous Fish Restoration Plan
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of the Salmon are intended to "harmonize what Indian people
know about the basin's natural environment, what humans have
imposed on that environment, and what can be done to create a
balanced and sustainable existence. '231
The Spirit of the Salmon integrates its gravel-to-gravel
approach into an adaptive management framework that carefully
monitors and evaluates the program so that natural resource
managers "learn by doing. 232 This flexible approach allows for
scientific uncertainty in measuring whether or not salmon survival
levels are being achieved.233 Unlike most federal and state plans,
if survival levels are not being achieved, Spirit of the Salmon
allows for modification and additional actions based on what is
working and what is not.23 4 In addition to making recommendations, Spirit of the Salmon provides the context for decision
making: scientific and legal justifications, directions for implementation, and analyses of expected outcomes. 235 To accomplish
these objectives, the first volume of Spirit of the Salmon sets out
ten proposals for institutional change, along with thirteen scientific
hypotheses and the recommended actions associated with each.2 36
The second volume contains subbasin-by-subbasin return goals
and the restoration actions that must be undertaken to achieve
them.237
Most of the recommendations described in the Spirit of the
Salmon are beyond the means and control of the CRITFC member
of the Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Yakama Tribes, vol. 1, Cultural
Context, Executive Summary, (CRITFC) (1995) available at http://www.
critfc.org/text/trptext.html (hereafter "Columbia River Restoration Plan")
231 Columbia River Restoration Plan, vol. 1, Cultural Context, available at
http://www.critfc.org/text/trptext.htm.
232 Columbia River Restoration Plan, vol. 1, Legal and Institutional
Context,
available at http://www.critfc.org/text/trptext.htm.
233 Columbia River Restoration Plan, vol. 1, Executive Summary,
available at
http://www.critfc.org/text/trptext.html.
234 Columbia River Restoration Plan, vol. 1, Executive Summary, available
at
http://www.critfc.org/text/trptext.htmi.
235 Columbia River Restoration Plan, vol. 1, Executive Summary,
available at
http://www.critfc.org/text/trptext.htm.
236
See CRITFC, Columbia
River Restoration
Plan, vol. 1,
http://www.critfc.org/text/trptext.html (last visited Jan. 08, 2007).
237 Id. (listing specific subbasin plans).
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tribes and will require collaboration with up to five states, over
twenty-five tribes, and two countries. 238 The political process is
slow and the outcome uncertain but the tribes are not waiting, they
are not standing still. They are steadily and successfully building
tribal capacity for the assumption of greater responsibility and
control over the management of Columbia River salmon. 23 9 Tribal
restoration projects resulted in 242,000 fall Chinook passing the
Bonneville Dam in 1999, 136 percent of the past ten-year
24
average. 4° In addition, Coho salmon were reintroduced into the
Snake River basin where they had not returned since 1986 and
several species of salmon returned to the Umatilla Basin for the
first time in seventy years.24 '
While the Spirit of the Salmon has not garnered much
attention from state or federal authorities, its creation and implementation are important examples of the nation building approach.
Spirit of the Salmon combines fisheries management, policy
development, advocacy, litigation support, habitat restoration, and
fundraising while addressing the requirements of tribal treaties, the
ESA, and other federal and state laws protecting salmon and
It
salmon habitat throughout the Columbia River Basin. 242
provides regional coordination for the tribes' individual fisheries
programs and aids in fish restoration and enhancement of the
tribes' respective territories.2 43 The strategic leadership of the
CRITFC, based on the Celilo Fish Committee, led to the Spirit of
the Salmon, a step in nation building that ensures that salmon are
given the significance they hold in tribal cultural beliefs and the
protection required by treaty.

CRITFC,

238

Plan Status

(1999-2001),

available at http://www.critfc.

org/text/status.htm I.
239

Id. See, e.g., CRITFC, Fisheries Enforcement, available at http://www.

critfc.org/text/critfe.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (explaining that CRITFE
officers are Oregon certified police officers and serve as an extension of tribal
law enforcement).
240 CRITFC, supra note 238.
241 CRITFC, Spirit of the Salmon Fund, The Work of Salmon Restoration,
http://www.critfc.org/sots/salmonwork.html. (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
242 The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, supra note
214.
243

Id.
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Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission
Everybody is looking for a solution to 'the problem'
but the solution was signed in 1854.244

When the Ojibwe (also known as Chippewa or Anishinaabe) tribes first entered into treaties with the Federal government
they possessed approximately 27 million acres of land in
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and the upper peninsula of Michigan.245
By the end of treaty making in 1871, the tribes had transferred
approximately ninety-eight percent of their traditional lands. 246 As
the tribes tried to enforce their treaty reserved rights on the ceded
land, conflicts with non-Indian settlers inevitably arose. While
early federal decisions generally supported Ojibwe rights, state
courts were far less friendly. 247 Ojibwe rights to off-reservation
resources were further complicated with the passage of Public Law
280 in Minnesota and Wisconsin, which subjected
the tribes to
248
cases.
criminal
and
civil
both
in
state jurisdiction
Beginning with the Voigt decision in 1983, the validity of
Ojibwe off-reservation rights to hunt, fish, and gather was
recognized by numerous court decisions, however, state and local
resentment ran deep. 249 Unlike the Pacific Northwest fishing rights
244

Statement of Tom Maulson, Chippewa, quoted in Spearfishing Treaty Leader

Honored by Magazine, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Dec. 19, 1990, at 1B (referring to
disputes over Chippewa treaty fishing rights).
245 Wilkinson, supra note 224, at 383.
246 Id. at 388.
247 See, e.g., In re Blackbird, 109 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Wis.
1901) (holding Indian
on-reservation fishing are not controlled by state law); See also State v. Morrin,
117 N.W. 1006 (1908) (finding off-reservation fishing rights of the Chippewa
abrogated by Wisconsin statehood).
248 See 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 25 U.S.C. § 1360 (as amended) (2007).
249 See Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt
(LCO 1), 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983) (holding
presidential removal order in 1854 treaty void); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin (LCO VII), 740 F. Supp. 1400
(W.D. Wis. 1990) (finding Chippewa entitled to 50% of safe harvest). Lac
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin (LCO
VI), 707 F. Supp. 1034 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (holding regulation of members offreservation harvest rights reserved to Chippewa on condition they enact
management plan in accordance with biologically sound principles necessary for
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disputes, in the Ojibwe cases the courts repeatedly held that there
were no scarcities of resources. However, those willing to risk

exercising their rights were subjected to threats, physical assaults,

and property damage. 250 The Ojibwe tribes read the ruling in the
Voigt decision as an opportunity to develop their own regulations
for managing off-reservation resources and in 1984 formed the
Great
Lakes 1 Indian
Fish
and
Wildlife
Commission
25
("GLIFWC.,,)
The GLIFWC is an inter-tribal co-management agency
committed to the implementation of off-reservation treaty rights on
behalf of its eleven Ojibwe member tribes. 252 The GLIFWC
conservation of species being harvested); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin (LCO II), 653 F. Supp. 1420 (W.D.
Wis. 1987) (finding Chippewa entitled to use, harvest, and sell virtually every
natural resource in ceded territory and to use modem harvesting techniques);
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin
(LCO IV), 668 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (stating state could regulate offreservation hunting, fishing, and gathering rights only for conservation, public
health, and safety purposes) and denying state's request to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over the tribal members); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin (LCO V), 686 F. Supp. 226 (W.D.
Wis. 1987) (vacating modest living standard because even if permitted to and
capable of harvesting every available resource in ceded territory Chippewa
could not achieve it)..
250 See, e.g., Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v.
Wisconsin, 653 F.Supp. 1420, 1434 (W.D.Wis. 1987). See also, Wilkinson,
supra note 224, at 376 (stating non-Indian protesters violently interfered with
Indian fishing and assaulted numerous Indian fishers, including tribal judge);
Bob Sector, Chippewa Fishing Rights Dispute Stirs Lake Country, L.A. TIMES,
May 1, 1989, at 1 (non-Indian protesters shouting "Equal rights for all
Americans! "Timber niggers!" and "Spear an Indian, save a walleye!" kept at
bay by riot-helmeted police with dogs)
251 Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
v. Voigt (LCO
1), 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983); The Harvard
Project on Indian Economic Development, Treaty Rights/National Forest
Memorandum of Understanding, Honoring Nations (2000), http://www.ksg.
harvard.edu/hpaied/hn/hn_2000 mou.htm.
252 Great Lakes
Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission (GLIFWC),
http://www.glifwc.org/ (showing that GLIFWC's member tribes include the Bay
Mills Indian Community, Keweenaw Bay Indian Community and the Lac Vieux
Desert Band in Michigan; the Bad River, Red Cliff, Lac du Flambeau, Lac
Courte Oreilles, Sokaogon and St. Croix Bands in Wisconsin; and the Fond du
Lac and Mille Lacs tribes in Minnesota; See also GLIFWC, Links,
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exercises powers delegated by its member tribes, each of whom
retained hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in territories ceded
through treaties with the U.S. government. 253 The GLIFWC's
Board of Commissioners ("Board") is composed of a tribal
chairperson from each member tribe or a designee who provides
the direction and policy for the organization. 2 4 The GLIFWC's
mission is to help ensure "significant, off-reservation255 harvests
while protecting the resources for generations to come.,
Ceded areas within national forests are important sources
for Ojibwe who gathered plants and animals used for medicinal,
ceremonial, and utility uses, as well as for food. For example,
wiigwaas (birch bark) has a variety of uses including the making of
canoes, baskets, and winnowing trays.256 Harvesting includes
showing respect to and for the trees, utilizing proper harvesting
techniques, and taking care not to take more than needed for the
purpose. As one tribal member states, "trees are considered living
relatives of the Anishinaabeg, and the bark is considered a gift.
http://www.glifwc.org/Links.htm (showing GLIFWC member websites); See
also http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/constitutions.htm.
253 See Treaty with the Ottawa, Etc., art. 13, Mar. 28, 1836, 7 Stat. 491 ("The
Indians stipulate for the right of hunting on the lands ceded, with the other usual
privileges of occupancy, until the land is required for settlement."); Treaty with
the Chippewa, art. 5, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536 ("The privilege of hunting,
fishing, and gathering the wild rice, upon the rivers and the lakes included in the
territory ceded, is guaranteed to the Indians, during the pleasure of the United
States president."); Treaty with the Chippewa, art. 2, Oct. 4, 1842, 7 Stat. 59
("The Indians stipulate for the right of hunting on the ceded territory, with the
other usual privileges of occupancy. . ."); Treaty with the Chippewa, art. 11,
Sep. 20, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109 ("[S]uch [Indians] as reside in the territory hereby
ceded, shall have the right to hunt and fish therein, until otherwise ordered by
the President").
254

See GLIFWC, supra note 252.

See id. "GLIFWC staff includes tribal representatives, managers, biologists
and lawyers," who deal "with non-Indian governments on such matters as timber
management, sustainable plant harvest levels, wildlife population data, and
camping regulations.GLIFWC is also an active participant in regional and
international bodies concerned with the health and status of Lake Superior
specifically and the Great Lakes generally." The Harvard Project on American
Indian Economic Development, supra note 214.
256 See GLIFWC, Maniwiigwaase--Gatherbirch bark, Mazina'igan Supp., p. I
(Fall 2002), available at http://www.glifwc.org/Publications/mazinaigan/
Gatheringsupplement.pdf.
255
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Anishinaabeg do the appropriate ceremonies we have been taught
2 57
when harvesting any of the gifts afforded our nation."
In the 1970s, the Ojibwe and the state of Wisconsin entered
into over thirty interim agreements to guide the conduct of the par258
ties while the courts made rulings on disputed natural resources.
Court decisions left Ojibwe gathering rights on ceded lands within
the National Forests ambiguous, but rather than return to court, in
the early 1990s the GLIFWC and the United States Forest Service
("USFS") chose to negotiate a framework by which these rights
would be acknowledged, interpreted, and implemented.2 59 After
six years of consultation they reached agreement and a
Memorandum of Understanding between the parties was ratified in
June 1999.260
A.
A Memorandum Regarding Tribal and Forest
Service Relations
The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding between the
Lake Superior Ojibwe tribes and the United States Forest Service
("MOU") begins with a Preamble stating that the agreement
concerns the relationships between the sovereign tribes and the
USFS and is based on the principle of government-to-government
interactions.2 61 "The purpose of the agreement is to establish
257
258
259

Id. at 8.
Wilkinson, supra note 224, at 403-10.
The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, supra

note
214.
260
id.

Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Tribal - USDA-Forest Service
Relations on National Forest Lands Within the Territories Ceded in Treaties of
1836, 1837, and 1842, U.S. - Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, June 3, 1999
[hereafter GLIFWC MOU], Preamble available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r9/
cnnf/reports/mou/mou!_rev.pdf. The tribes (all members of the GLIFWC) are:
Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, Lac du
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, Lac Courte Oreilles Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin,
Sokaogon Chippewa Community of the Mole Lake Band, Red Cliff Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians; Bay
Mills Indian Community, Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, and Lac Vieux
Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians. Id. § II(A).
261
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standards by which" the United States Forest Service (USFS) and
the tribes "will act consistently across national forest lands within
areas ceded in the treaties of 1836, 1837, and 1842. "262 The MOU
recognizes the tribes' existing treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather
on national forest lands, but also recognizes that the USFS
"manages and provides access to ecosystems that support these
' 26 3
activities."
The MOU is based upon specific articulated governing
principles and fundamental assumptions including the "tribes'
treaty-guaranteed hunting, fishing and gathering rights" within the
ceded territories, "the tribes' inherent sovereignty and retained
regulatory authority" regarding those rights, the "United States
Government's trust responsibility and treaty obligations", and
recognition of the USFS' forest management and law enforcement
responsibilities.264
Purposes of the MOU include establishing "a framework
for a cooperative, government-to-government relationship between
the tribes and the United States Government that ensures the
meaningful exercise of the tribes' ceded territory rights on the
lands administered by the" USFS within the ceded territories,
"agreed-upon parameters under which the tribes' ceded territory
gathering rights may be exercised", and protecting, managing, and
enhancing the "ecosystems and communities that support the
ceded territory rights on
natural resources subject to the 26tribes'
5
USFS.
the
by"
lands administered
The tribes and the USFS reserve certain rights, claims, and
defenses in the MOU and acknowledge that the MOU is "the result
of compromise and policy choices" and "may not reflect the full
extent of the tribes' ceded territory rights or" the USFS' "responsibility to manage National Forests. 266 Finally, the MOU
specifically states that it "is not intended to alter usufructuary
rights recognized in" Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Voigt2 67 or
262

263
26

Id. Preamble.

Id.

1Id. §§ IIl(A-F).
265 Id. § IV.
266
267.

Id. § 111(I)(3).
Id. § ll(l)(4).Voigt, 700 F.2d at 351-58.
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Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band.268 "The MOU does not alter the
authority of any government regarding the regulation of treaty
rights under those decisions.' 2 6 9
The core of the GLIFWC MOU is a section addressing
specific agreements the parties have entered into to implement the
government-to-government relationship. These include "MOU
administration and implementation", "National Forest Planning
and Decision-Making", "Natural Resource Harvest Management",
research, and monitoring, "Law Enforcement", and the amendment
of the MOU and its appendices. 270 It is within these specific agreements and the underlying mutual interests that the specific agreements are meant to address that one finds evidence of the nation
building approach. As detailed below, these agreements help to
foster joint decision-making and the government-to-government
relations necessary for nation building.
B.

The Core of GLIFWC Nation Building

Charles F. Wilkinson noted in his article regarding Ojibwe
treaty fishing rights that in 1989 the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources stated that "co-management" of Wisconsin
natural resources involved the "relinquish[ment] of state
(constitutionally granted) rights to protect the interests of all
[Wisconsin] citizens" and was "not good state policy." 27 1 While
CLIFCW MOU § 11l(1)(4). Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (holding "Executive Order of 1850 removing
268

Chippewa from lands previously ceded did not terminate Chippewa usufructuary
rights under 1837 Treaty", "Mille Lacs Band did not relinquish usufructuary
rights when it entered into 1855 Treaty", and "Chippewa usufructuary rights not
extinguished
when Minnesota admitted to the Union.").
26 9
270

GLIFWC MOU,§ I11(l)(4).
id. § VI.

Wilkinson, supra note 224, at 409 n183 (citing Memorandum from C.D.
Besadny, Secretary of Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2
Wisconsin Legislators, Nov. 6, 1989 and Letter from Wisconsin State Senator
Lloyd Kincaid, Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Transportation,
Tourism and Conservation, to Frank Boyle, Chairperson of the American Indian
271

Study Committee (June 12, 1990) ( commenting on the possibility of "co-

management" in Wisconsin, Senator Kincaid stated that "the DNR not
authorized to share regulatory and management responsibilities with tribes or
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the Great Lakes states have been slow to recognize the benefits of
co-management with the Ojibwe, the Memorandum of Understanding between the GLIFWC tribes and the USFS shows that the
federal government is willing to do otherwise.
The MOU specifically addresses common goals of ecosystem sustainability and law enforcement. It does so by recognizing the USFS as the federal agency responsible for "managing
the National Forests for the benefit of present and future
generations" and the tribes' goal of protecting these resources by
"ensuring their sustainability for use by the seventh generation
hence., 272 In addition, the tribes and the USFS agree that the
tribes' enforcement of ceded territory rights requires an administration of justice that is best accomplished within their own communities and in their own forums. 273 "The parties seek to establish
a mutually beneficial efficient and effective system for enforcing
applicable laws. 274
The MOU also promotes implementation of the Federal
trust responsibility by seeking to establish a framework for
collaboration, communication, and information exchange that will
"nurture understanding and maximize mutual benefits," and that
will enhance the development of tribal capabilities necessary to
ensure effective tribal participation in the processes and procedures
established.275 The mutual interests section explicitly states that
"one of the Tribes' primary goals is to achieve self-determination
and self-governance through the exercise of their retained
sovereign governmental authority regarding their ceded territory
rights," and that a key USFS policy is to administer its programs
and activities in a manner that recognizes the tribes' governments
and the authority that they carry out on behalf of their commu2 76
nities.
The specific agreements reached under the 1999 MOU also
support the de facto sovereignty of the GLIFWC tribes. The
anyone or anything else" and that "any proposal based on co-management of
Wisconsin natural resources would be "dead on arrival" in the Senate.").
272 GLIFWC MOU, § V(C).

Id. § V(D).
Id. § V(D).
275 Id. § V(F).
273

274

276

Id. § V(A).
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parties agree to "reach consensus in all decisions, actions, and
processes contemplated by the MOU" and to attempt to resolve
any dispute "at the lowest possible level on a government-togovernment basis between properly authorized representatives of
the parties who have the authority to resolve the dispute in
question. 2 7 The MOU creates a Technical Working Group comprised of qualified natural resource scientists, managers, and
researchers designated by both the USFS and the tribes to facilitate
communication and resolution of outstanding issues. 2 78 The parties
agree to share data and information and to cooperate in identifying
and seeking funding to improve the implementation of the
279
agreement..
In an important step in cultural match and strategic
thinking, the MOU mandates that all parties participate in cultural
sensitivity training for their personnel and that they engage in joint
and coordinated public education efforts to inform the public about
the MOU and its underlying purposes. 280 These efforts help build
the mutual respect and understanding needed for a successful partnership meant to benefit Ojibwe and non-Indians as well.
In a move that clarifies court reluctance to define
meaningful consultation, the GLIFWC MOU explicitly states that
the USFS will consult with and facilitate effective participation by
28
the tribes at all stages and levels of the decision-making process. 1
Consultation is to be conducted on a consistent and timely basis at
the appropriate levels of government and is to be flexible to deal
with "ever-changing circumstances and adaptive natural resource
management responses."2 8 2 The MOU expressly states that the
USFS will "consider the effects of its decisions on treaty resources
28 3
and the ability of the Tribes to exercise treaty gathering rights."
USFS decision and analysis documents, including those required
by the National Forest Management Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, must "show how tribal information and

277

Id §§ VI(A)(I), VI(A)(1), (2).

278

280

Id. § VI(A)(3).
Id. § VI(A)(3)(d), (4).
Id. § VI(A)(5).

281

Id. § VI(B)(i)(a).

279

282

id.

283

Id. § VI(B)(1)(b).
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involvement was taken into account in analyzing the effects
of
284
decision."
the
making
in
and
actions
potential management
In an impressive example of effective institution building in
support of self-governance and nation building, the GLIFWC
MOU specifically incorporates into the agreement the tribes'
Model Off-Reservation National Forest Gathering Code ("Code")
and a Tribal Self-Regulation Agreement ("Self-Regulation Agreement.") By agreeing that "primary enforcement and administration
of justice responsibilities for the Tribes' regulations lies with the
Tribes and their properly authorized agencies", the MOU gives the
tribes primary right and responsibility
to enforce their regulations
285
within the forests' treaty areas.
Inter-tribal governmental organizations like the CRITFC
and GLIFWC enable tribes to engage in nation building by pooling
technical resources and creating a single powerful voice in public
policy affecting environmental resources on which they and their
people depend. They also provide a framework for collaborative
government-to-government relations that benefit both Indians and
non-Indians alike. The CRITFC and GLIFWC are effective examples of nation building institutional vehicles that advance the goals
of their member tribes and are grounded in "shared principles and
[] clearly defined processes for joint decision-making and conflict
resolution" in natural resource management. 286 Through strategic
leadership, technical expertise, and a "just do it" attitude, the
CRITFC and GLIFWC have gained respect and support from their
own people, federal and state agencies, and the non-Indian public
as they advance their rights of self-government and comanagement of the environmental resources on which their people
depend.

284 id.

Id. § VI(E)(4); See also GLIFWC, The Harvard Project on American Indian
Economic Development, supra note 214.
286 The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, supra note
285

214.
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Nez Perce Gray Wolf Management
"The federal value system is different than the
tribes. They take dominion over the land. The
tribe[s'] value system says live with the ecosystem
-not try
to conquer or tweak it to what we think is
28 7
best."

By the early twentieth century the gray wolf, once native to
most of North America, was almost completely exterminated
through the elimination of its natural prey, conversion of its habitat
into agricultural lands, and extreme predator control programs
initiated by federal, state, and private agencies. 288 Fear and
superstition of white settlers also contributed to the decline of the
wolf. Euro-Americans associated the wolf with the devil, pagan
worship, evil, and man's bestial nature, a view that "came to the
New World with the first colonists. ' 289 In 1978 the entire gray
wolf species was listed as endangered under the ESA.2 9 °
In August 1987 the Federal government approved and
released the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan
("Northern Rocky Recovery Plan") calling for states to assume
responsibility for gray wolf recovery pursuant to the ESA. 29 1 The
state of Idaho responded by enacting legislation that expressly
prohibited the Idaho Department of Fish and Game from
participation in cooperative wolf recovery efforts. 292 Idaho's
287

Statement of Aaron Miles, natural resource manager for the Nez Perce Tribe,

quoted in Brittany Karford, Tribe Welcomes Wolf 'Brothers', BYU NewsNet,
Sept. 6, 2005, http://newsnet.byu.edu./story.cfm/56400 (emphasis added).
288 U.S. Fish &Wildlife Service, Gray Wolf Biology Questions and Answers
(Nov. 2006), http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2007/qandagraywolfbiology.pdf.
289

U.S.

FISH

&

WILDLIFE

SERV.,

NORTHERN

ROCKY

MONTAIN

WOLF

RECOVERY PLAN 10 (1987), available at http://www.fws.gov/mountainprairie/species/mammals/wolf/northernrockymountainwolfrecoverypan.pdf..
290 Wildlife and Fisheries, 43 Fed. Reg. 9612 (Mar. 9, 1978). A
subspecies of
the gray wolf, the Northern Rocky Mountain wolf, was the firs listed in 1973.
38 Fed. Reg. 14,678, 14,678 (June 4, 1973).
291 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 289 at iv.
292 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-715(2) (1988) (stating that a department is not

authorized to enter into cooperative agreement with the federal government
unless it is expressly authorized by Idaho statute).
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opposition, which had "little to do with wolves and lots to do with
state sovereignty," 29 3 continued for several years, opening the door
for the Nez Perce tribe to step forward and accept the

responsibility for wolf recovery that the state had declined.
In Nez Perce culture, hiniine (wolf in Nez Perce) is

considered a brother and the tribe draws parallels between the
wolves' fate and their own.2 94 Many Nez Perce narratives include
the wolf as a spiritual guide, naming ceremonies included wolf
names, and dancers used wolf pelts as part of their regalia.29 5 The
wolf family-centered hunting lifestyle is similar to that of the

tribe's own culture and the wolf became a symbol for the tribe's
own struggle to survive. 296 Both the wolf and the tribe were
perceived as blocking Euro-American settlement of the west and
both were persecuted and removed from their traditional homelands. 297 From the Nez Perce perspective both were "struggling to
regain their rightful place" and reintroduction of the gray wolf was
seen as the "return of a long lost family member who had been
driven away,
exiled or killed out of fear, hatred or misunder298
standing."

293

Statement of Rep. Tom Dorr, Lawmakers Kill State Plan For Dealing With

Wolf, Idaho Spokesman Review, Feb. 2, 1995, at Al.
The Harvard Project on Indian Economic Development, Idaho Gray Wolf

294

Recovery Wildlife Program, Nez Perce Tribe, Honoring Nations (1999),
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaiedihn/hn_1999_wolf.htm.
295 Id. see also Jaime Pinkham, The Land Ethic: Everyday Lessons,
n.d., at
http://www.wildemess.org/AboutUs/LandEthic-PinkhamPerspective.cfin?TopL
evel=About ("It's not what we give the wolf, but the feeling that having him
back in the environment gives to us.").
296 Curt Mack, Restoring the Gray Wolf in Idaho, Endangered
Species Bulletin
(July 1999).
297 See Treaty with the Nez Perce, June II, 1855, 12 Stat. 957 (ceding
70% of
traditional land, leaving 8mm acres to Nez Perce); Treaty between the United
States of America and the Nez Perce Tribe, June 9, 1863, 14 Stat. 647 (ceding
7.2mm acres (90%), leaving 800,000 acres); see also Charles F. Wilkinson,
Indian Tribal Rights and the National Forests: The Case of the Aboriginal
Lands of the Nez Perce Tribe, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 435, 445 (1998) (stating by the
end of allotment Nez Perce lost more than 99% of land owned prior to treaty
period).
298 Mack, supra note 296;Statement of Levi J. Holt, Nez Perce, n.d., available
at
http://www.defenders.org/releases/pr2004b/wolf/leviholtstestiment.pdf.
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A large proportion of the wolf recovery zone designated in
the Northern Rocky Recovery Plan lay within lands ceded by the
Nez Perce and within the boundaries of the tribe's reservation.
The tribe sought and gained the right to participate in an early
stage of the recovery program and it was an active member of the
gray wolf Environmental Impact Statement advisory team.2 99 The
tribe made it clear that it wanted to be a participant in program
management and indicated that it "should be 'a' or 'the' major
300
player in Wolf Recovery."
The Nez Perce knew that further involvement would
require both technical capacity and political courage, including
professional wildlife staff, access to appropriate equipment, and a
willingness to be "wolf ambassadors." 30'1 The tribe had hoped to
partner with Idaho in the recovery effort but when that proved
impossible, they entered into partnership talks with the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS"). The tribe's Executive Committee believed their staff's experience with other
recovery efforts gave them expertise on the technical aspects of
wolf recovery, and they saw this situation as an opportunity to
30 2
strengthen external relationships.
The tribe signed a cooperative agreement with the USFWS
and in January 1995 the first group of relocated wolves were
released into central Idaho. The Nez Perce developed and gained
federal approval of its Gray Wolf Recovery and Management Plan
for Idaho and by March 1995 had entered into a precedent setting
30 3
cooperative agreement with the USFWS to restore the gray wolf.
It was the first time the federal government had contracted with a
tribe to lead recovery and management responsibilities for a state-

299

The Harvdard Project on American Indian Economic Development, supra

note 294.
300 Patrick Impero Wilson, Wolves, Politics, and the Nez Perce: Wolf Recovery
in CentralIdaho and the Role of Native Tribes, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 543, 554
(1999) (citing USFWS, Final Environmental Impact Statement: The Reintroduction of Gray Wolves to Yellowstone National Park and Central Idaho
(1994)).

The Harvdard Project on American Indian Economic Development, supra
note 294.
30!

302d.
303/id.
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wide recovery effort of an endangered species. 30 4 Considered a
model for defining federal and tribal government relationships, the
Idaho Wolf Recovery Program adopted a collaborative approach
working closely with other government and private entities to
"balance the0 5biological needs of wolves with the social concerns of
Idahoans.

'3

Despite Nez Perce success in managing the Wolf
Recovery Program °6 , Idaho legislature continued to debate a state
wolf management plan, a "largely symbolic [example] of the legal
maneuvering and political posturing that [had] consistently
characterized [Idaho] wolf recovery."33°7 Idaho's goal was to end
federal oversight of gray wolves within its boundaries as soon as
possible. Hunters and ranchers encouraged the Idaho legislature to
sue the federal government and have the wolves removed, arguing
that it was unconstitutional for Congress to take charge of a state
issue. 308 Instead, the Idaho Conservation League, U.S. Senator
Larry Craig, the Wolf Education and Research Center, and various
other livestock and outfitter groups drafted a plan to outline how
the state would manage wolves once they were removed from ESA
the USFWS was required to approve
listing.30 9 Prior to delisting,
3 10
plan.
the state management
304

Mack, supra note 296.

Idaho Wolf Recovery Program, PROGRESS REPORT (1999-2001) available at
http://www.nezperce.org/content/Programs/wildlifeprogram.htm. The Recovery
Program includes the USFWS, the Nez Perce Tribe, and USDA Wildlife Services.
Id.
306 The overall goal of Nez Perce recovery plan was to restore self-sustaining
population of gray wolves to Idaho by maintaining minimum of ten breeding
packs for three consecutive years). See Mack, supra note 296. By the end of
2006, the Northern Rocky Wolf population had achieved its numerical and
distributional recovery goal for seven consecutive years. 72 Fed. Reg. 6106,
6108 (Feb. 8, 2007).
307 Wilson, supra note 300, at 552.
308 Crystl Murray, Nez Perce Wolf Recovery has Friends & Foes, Idaho Native,
305

n.d., http://www.uidaho.edu/idahonatives/nez/wolf.html.
309 Id. In order for the gray wolf be delisted and brought back under state
control, the Federal government mandated that Montana, Idaho and Wyoming
each must manage for at least ten breeding pairs and at least 100 wolves in
midwinter so the northern Rocky Mountain wolf population never fell below 30
breeding pairs and 300 wolves. Press Release, USFWS, Interior Department
Announces Delisting of Western Great Lakes Wolves; Proposed Delisting of
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In December 2001 Idaho Governor Dirk Kempthorne
proposed that the Nez Perce and the state work together to develop
an agreement "delineating roles in the management of gray wolves
31 1
in and adjacent to the Nez Perce treaty territory after delisting."
Nez Perce Chairman Samuel N. Penney responded that the tribe
was committed to being a part of post-delisting wolf conservation
and that a positive working relationship between the tribe and the
state was "essential to the effective future management of the
3
wolves." 12
"On February 7, 2005 the Service promulgated a new rule
under ESA section 10(j) that granted those states with approved
wolf management plans an opportunity to assume many of the
management responsibilities currently performed by the Service."
313 The Idaho Wolf Conservation and Management Plan of 2002
was approved and in April 2005 the State of Idaho and the Nez
Perce tribe entered into an agreement to "work in concert as
sovereign governments to maintain self sustaining wolf populations and to avoid the potential of wolves returning to federal
3
protection." 14

Northern Rocky Mountain Wolves (Jan. 29, 2007) (on file with author). If the
wolf population ever dropped below that level, the wolves could be relisted
under the USFWS' emergency listing authorities. Press Release, USFWS,
Interior Department Announces Delisting of Western Great Lakes Wolves;
Proposed Delisting of Northern Rocky Mountain Wolves (Jan. 29, 2007) (on file
with author).
310 72 Fed. Reg. 6106, 6111 (Feb. 8, 2007).
311 Letter from Dirk Kempthorne, Governor, State of Idaho, to Samuel N.
Penney, Chairman, Nez Perce Tribe (Dec. 13, 2001) (on file with author).
312 Letter from Samuel N. Penney, Chairman, Nez Perce Tribe, to Dirk
Kempthome, Governor, State of Idaho (Jan. 25, 2002) (on file with author).
313 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Secretary of the Interior and the
State of Idaho (Jan. 5, 2006), www.fws.gov/pacific/news/2006/documents/
IDWolfMOA.pdf.
314 Memorandum of Agreement Between the State of Idaho and the
Nez Perce
Tribe Concerning Coordination of Wolf Conservation and Related Activities in
Idaho (April 7, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://fishandgame.
idaho.gov/cms/wildlife/wolves/state/nezperce-tribalmoa.pdf (hereafter "Nez
Perce MOA").
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A.
An Agreement Concerning Wolf Conservation and
Related Activities
The 2005 Memorandum of Agreement between the State of
Idaho and the Nez Perce ("MOA") delineates how the state and the
tribe will work together as sovereign governments to maintain wolf
populations to avoid the potential of wolves again coming under
federal protection, and is meant to demonstrate to the federal
government "good faith efforts to responsibly and effectively
conserve wolves for the long-term, while addressing wolf related
concerns of Idaho citizens." 315 The MOA recognizes that wolf
conservation in Idaho is an area of mutual concern to both parties
and its stated purpose is to designate the parties' responsibilities
with respect to conservation, to jointly obtain the necessary
funding to maintain conservation, and to delineate a process for
sport and subsistence harvest of wolves according to a "fair share"
agreement between the tribe and the state.316
The MOA repeatedly states that the parties will "work
together" while at the same time recognizing that each retains
"authorities independent of each other."317 In the definitions
section, the Nez Perce tribe is explicitly defined as a sovereign
government represented by the Nez Perce Tribal Executive
Committee. 318 Both the tribe and the state recognize that the
federal government has oversight of wolf management prior to
delisting and the MOA is to be fully implemented upon that
event. 319 Upon implementation, the tribe and the state agree to
support each other in the exercise of their own unique authorities
as sovereign governments in carrying out the roles and
responsibilities explicitly listed in the MOA.32°
The MOA dispute resolution mechanism is of interest
because it implicitly rejects litigation while at the same time
respecting the sovereign rights of the parties. Disagreements
315Id. §§ I(D), I(E).

Id. § 2.
See, e.g., id. § 4.
318 Id. § 3(C) (emphasis added).
316

311

319

Id. § 5(B)(i), (iii).

320

Id § 7(A); see also id., Table I (detailing specific roles and responsibilities

of tribe, state, federal agencies for long-term conservation of wolves in Idaho).
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among the Technical Committee are to be brought to a mutually
agreed upon outside facilitator who is equally paid by both
parties. 321 If the disagreement cannot be solved by the facilitator,
the dispute is brought to the Policy Committee who is to make a
"good faith" effort to resolve the issue. 32 2 Any issue not resolved
by the Policy Committee may be decided between the Governor
and the Chairman. 323 At no time will "legal authorities of either
the Tribe or the State be impinged upon. Authorities of both
governments are sovereign and [the] Agreement does not affect
' 324
such sovereignty."
Fair share allocation and harvestable surplus formulas are
explicitly detailed within the MOA, but are guidelines rather than
specific targets and are meant to reflect the "best interest[s] of the
wildlife resources and the parties., 325 The parties are to work
together to secure needed funding, and allocation of any received
funds is specifically detailed in the agreement. 326 The MOA may
be terminated upon written notice by either party, but only after the
Policy Committee has engaged in good faith facilitated efforts to
resolve the concerns that may lead to such notice. 327 The MOA
includes appendices that serve to remind
the parties of their
32 8
government-to-government relations.

B.

Nez Perce Nation Building

Joseph P. Kalt holds that exercising sovereignty in intergovernmental relations turns on nation building: a sophisticated
"sovereignty" attitude, capable institutions with capable people,

321
322
323

.324
325
3 26
327
328

Id. § 8(G).
Id. § 8(G), 8(H).
Id. § 8(J).
Id. § 8(1).
Id. § 9(B)(ii).
id,

§ 10.

Id. § 12(C).
See id. app. A Governor's Proclamation on State/Tribal Governmental

Relations (July 3, 2002) (including letters from Governor and Chairman
initiating relationship that led to MOA); see also id app. B Tribe/fldaho]
Department of Fish and Game MOA (Jan. 24, 1992) and Nez Perce MOA
Appendix C Areas Identifiedfor the Purposesof the Agreement.
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and cultural legitimacy and credibility. 329 The wolf recovery
program presented the Nez Perce with a number of opportunities to
put their autonomy into effect. Overcoming bias towards tribes as
incapable of managing land and wildlife resources, the Nez Perce
became the primary actor in a field usually reserved to the states.33°
The tribe showed the federal and state government that it was
"technically competent and scientifically capable" of331restoring
biodiversity to the northern Rocky Mountain ecosystem.
With its successful wolf recovery program, the Nez Perce
opened the door for a co-management relationship with its greatest
opponent, Idaho. There are no less than eight references in the
agreement to the tribe as a sovereign government equal to the state.
Section 6 explicitly states that the agreement does not expand or
diminish any inherent, constitutional or statutory authority or
jurisdiction possessed by either party, and its implementation does
not "constitute an admission by either party to the existence or
scope of any such authority or jurisdiction." 332 Cornell and Kalt
remind us, however, that mere recognition of tribal rights or
sovereignty is not the same as nation building. 333 This negative
recognition of tribal authority (it could also be characterized as an
"agree to disagree" provision) was nonetheless a significant step
forward for Nez Perce/Idaho relations and one that likely would
not have occurred had the tribe not had in place capable
institutions making it a co-equal in Idaho wolf management.
Table 1 of the Nez Perce MOA, detailing the roles and
responsibilities of each sovereign supports this conclusion. Each
329

Joseph P. Kalt, Walking the Walk: Intergovernmental Relations as True

Sovereigns (Part III), at 10, http://www.arizonanativenet.com/media/arro/
kalpartiii.swf (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
330 Wilson, supra note 300, at 554.
For the Nez Perce Wolf Recovery project
the tribe assumed a management responsibility that the state, with much greater
resources, was expected to shoulder. Id. This was the first time the federal
government had contracted with a tribe to lead recovery and management
responsibilities for a state-wide recovery effort of an endangered species. Curt
Mack, Restoring the Gray Wolf in Idaho, Endangered Species Bulletin, Vol.
XXIV, No. 4 (July/Aug. 1999), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi mOASV/is_4_24/ai_58505407.
331Wilson, supra note 300, at 555.
332 Nez Perce MOA, supra note 314, at § 6(A).
333Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, supra note 15.
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task column is mirrored, substituting the word "Tribe" for "State"
and listing tribal territorial boundaries versus state territory as
needed.334 The "Harvest Regulations" section also supports tribal
and state sovereign equality. The state is to establish regulations
under its regulatory process to administer wolf harvest by hunters
under its jurisdiction. 335 The tribe is to establish regulations under
to administer wolf harvest by hunters under
its regulatory process
336
tribal jurisdiction.
Finally, both parties agree to the timely sharing of wolf
management data and recognize its proprietary nature. 337 The state
agrees not to share data collected by the tribe with third parties
without first notifying the tribe and disclosing that it is the tribe's
data.338 The state also agrees not to use the tribe's data in submission of any scientific articles without collaboration with the
tribe. 339 The return of the wolf was also a major step for the Nez
Perce in recapturing an element of tribal cultural heritage that
would lead to a "tremendous uplift" for the community. 340 As one
physically part
tribal member stated, "The value of having the' 34wolf
1
of Tribal culture once again is immeasurable."
On January 29, 2007, the Interior Department announced
the proposed delisting of the gray wolf in Idaho, Montana, and
Wyoming. 342 While delisting of the gray wolf was the ultimate
goal of tribal, state, and federal agencies, delisting in Idaho may
bring wolf recovery full circle. In anticipation of the USFWS
proposal to remove the wolves from the Endangered Species list,
114

Nez Perce MOA, supra note 314, at Table 1.

Id.at § 9(D)(ii).
Id. at § 9(D)(iii).
Id. at §§ 1I(A), I(C).
33 Id.
at §§ 1I(E).

131

336
337

339 Id.
340 Wilson,
341 id.
342

supra note 300, at 559.

72 Fed. Reg. 6106 (Feb. 8, 2007). The USFWS approved both the Idaho and

Montana wolf management plans. Id If Wyoming fails to adopt an approve
management regime, wolves in the significant portion of the range in
northwestern Wyoming, outside the National Parks, will retain their nonessential
experimental status under section 10(j) of the ESA. Id.The remainder of the
wolves (in Idaho and Montana) would be removed from the Endangered and
Threatened Species List. Id
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Idaho Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter told the Associated Press that
he will support public hunts to kill all but 100 of the state's gray
wolves if the federal government strips them of protection under
the ESA.343 Complaining that wolves should never have been
reintroduced and blaming them for unsuccessful elk hunting, dead
livestock, and the increasing cost of doing business for ranchers,
Otter indicated that hunters should reduce packs to the minimum
allowable without the animal again being considered as
endangered.344
Considering Idaho's current administration, it is difficult to
say whether or not the USFWS will remove the gray wolf from the
Endangered Species list and whether the state will uphold its end
of the 2005 Nez Perce/Idaho Memorandum. The Nez Perce MOA
specifically holds that the tribe and the state agree to "forego...
litigation against each other over wolf harvest and control issues in
Idaho during the Agreement's term." 345 However, the continuing
divergence of state and tribal cultural and world views may make
this impossible. Given Idaho's past opposition to wolf recovery
and its contentious relations with the federal government and the
tribe, it is likely that, short of a court order, the MOA will not be
implemented. Gray wolf recovery in Idaho may find itself back at
square one.

IX. EROSION

OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

As the case studies above suggest, ecosystem co-management agreements can strengthen tribal sovereignty in a number of
ways, including solidifying government-to-government relationJesse Harlan Alderman/Associated Press, Idaho Governor Urges Public Wolf
Hunts, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Jan. 12, 2007 at A12; Rocky Barker, Wolf Rally
Draws a Crowd, IDAHO STATESMAN, Jan, 12 2007 at 1 (Gov. Otter states "I'm
343

going to bid for the first ticket to shoot a wolf.").
344 Alderman, supra note 343, at A12.
Press Release, USFWS, Interior
Department Announces Delisting of Western Great Lakes Wolves; Proposed
Delisting of Northern Rocky Mountain Wolves (Jan. 29, 2007) (on file with
author) (stating if Idaho wolf population ever drops below ten breeding pairs (or
100 wolves), wolves could be relisted as endangered under USFWS emergency
listing authorities).
345 Nez Perce MOA, supra note 314, at § 6(B).
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ships with state and federal agencies and motivating tribal
governments to engage in the steps necessary to successfully carry
out the agreement. There is, however, another side to this coin.
Co-management agreements may be interpreted as an invitation by
tribes for state regulation of tribal lands and resources.3 46 If the
issue reaches litigation, a court may consider state environmental
regulation as favorable because it helps alleviate the "checker34 7
board" jurisdiction problem left from the legacy of allotment.
At least one Supreme Court decision suggests that a tribal-state
cooperative approach can open the door to state regulation. 348 This
decision looks at some of the ways that co-management
agreements might undermine tribal self-determination.
A.

The "Conservation Necessity" Doctrine
The aim is to accommodate the rights of Indians
under the Treaty and the rights of other people.
[Treaty] [r]ights can be controlled by the need to
conserve a species... [A] Treaty does not give the
Indians a federal right to pursue9 the last living
34
steelhead until it enters their nets.

In 1969 the Sohappy touched off a series of judicial decisions regarding the rights of the Columbia River treaty tribes in the
Northwest.
In Sohappy Judge Belloni articulated that state
authorities could regulate off-reservation treaty Indian fisheries but
state regulatory powers were limited by certain conditions and
standards. These standards became know as the "Conservation
Necessity" doctrine, which permits states to regulate the exercise
346

Shelly D. Stokes, Note, Ecosystem Co-Management Plans:

A Sound

Approach or a Threat to Tribal Rights?, 27 VT. L. REv. 421, 443 (2003).
347 Id.

348

See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (suggesting when state interests

outside reservation are implicated, states may regulate activities of tribe
members on tribal land when tribe itself invites state onto tribal land); see also
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989) (holding state zoning regulations applied to "open" area of Yakima
reservation).
349 Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973).
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and
of tribal reserved rights if the resources at issue are in jeopardy
350
so.
do
to
conservation
of
interests
the
in
necessary
it is
Specifically, Judge Belloni held that state regulation was
permissible under the following conditions: 1) the regulations
must be reasonable and necessary for conservation, must not discriminate against Indians, and must be the least restrictive means
of achieving the objective; 2) the protection of treaty fishing rights
must be a state regulatory objective, coequal with its fish conservation objectives; 3) state police power may be used only to the
extent necessary to prevent the exercise of a treaty right that would
imperil the continued existence of the fish resource; 4) Indians may
be permitted to fish at places and by means prohibited to nonIndians; and 5) the tribes must have an opportunity for meaningful
participation in the rulemaking process. 351 The state has the
burden of proving that the regulation is necessary.35 2
In the years following Sohappy, this doctrine as been
interpreted and defined in such a way as to suggest that even with a
co-management agreement in place there is still the danger that
state regulatory authority could be imposed on tribal lands and
treaty resources. For example, in United States v. Washington, the
court held that the plaintiff tribes were entitled to regulate the
treaty right fishing of its members without state interference only if
the tribe maintained specific qualifications and conditions. 353 The
qualifications included that the tribe had competent leadership and
organized government, effective enforcement of tribal fishing
regulations, experts in fishery science and management, and an
roll which included photographic
officially approved membership
354
ID cards for all members.

Conditions included that the tribe must (a) provide for full
and complete tribal fishing regulations that included any state
regulation that was reasonable and necessary for conservation; (b)
permit monitoring of off-reservation Indian fishing by the state to
the extent reasonable and necessary for conservation; and (c)
350

351
352

353
354

Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911-12 (D. Ct. Or. 1969).
Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911-12 (D. Ct. Or. 1969).
Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D. Ct. Or. 1969).

United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 340 (D.C. Wash. 1974).

United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 340-341 (D.C. Wash. 1974).
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provide fish catch reports, as to both on and off-reservation treaty
right fishing, when requested by the state for the purpose of
establishing escapement355goals and other reasonable and necessary
conservation purposes.
In 1974, while some tribes had the resources to comply
with Judge Boldt's qualifications, most did not. The conservation
necessity doctrine could lead to an erosion of tribal sovereignty for
some tribes because tribal environmental resource regulations that
are considered inadequate by states for the conservation and
protection of species could open the door to state regulations of
off-reservation treaty reserved rights. In response to these legal
decisions and to protect their treaty-reserved rights and sacred
heritage, tribes joined together and formed organizations like the
CRITFC and GLIFWC to provide coordination, technical assistance, and organized inter-tribal representation in regional
planning, policy, and decision-making so that tribal resources
would not become subject to state regulation. A tribe with inadequate environmental regulations or enforcement capabilities can be
at a significant disadvantage when negotiating natural resource
intergovernmental agreements.
While the conservation principles discussed above are
generally only applied to Indian activities which affect resources
held "in common" with other citizens, the Supreme Court has held
that even the exercise of on-reservation tribal treaty rights is
"subject to reasonable regulation by the State pursuant to its power
to conserve an important natural resource. 356 A recent Supreme
Court case takes this even further by suggesting that tribal/state
cooperative relations could be interpreted as an invitation for state
regulation.
B.

Nevada v.Hicks

In 2001, the United States Supreme Court held that the
right of tribes to "make their own laws and be governed by them"
does not exclude all state regulatory authority on an Indian
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United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 341 (D.C. Wash. 1974).
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 175 (1977).
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reservation. 357 The issue in Nevada v. Hicks was whether the
Fallon Tribal Court had jurisdiction over civil claims against state
officials who entered tribal land to execute a search warrant against
a tribal member
suspected of having violated state law outside the
358
reservation.
Specifically, defendant Hicks was under suspicion of
having killed, off the reservation, a California bighorn sheep,
which was a gross misdemeanor under Nevada law. 359 Nevada
courts had no jurisdiction on the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Indian
Reservation and the state search warrant included a clause that
tribal court authorization was necessary. 360 A search warrant was
obtained from the tribal court and a state game warden, accompanied by a tribal police officer, searched Hicks' yard, uncovering
only the head of a Rocky Mountain
bighorn, a different (and
36 1
sheep.
of
species
unprotected)
One year later, under further suspicion that Hick's had
again violated Nevada law, the state game warden obtained another
search warrant from state court. 362 This second warrant did not
explicitly require permission from the tribes, but a tribal court
warrant was nonetheless secured, and Hicks' home was again
(unsuccessfully) searched by wardens and tribal officers. Hicks
claimed that this second search damaged property and exceeded
the bounds of the warrant and after dismissal of other parties
brought suit3 against the state wardens in their individual
36
capacities.
The Supreme Court held that the Fallon Tribal Court did
not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court stated that tribal
authority to regulate state officers in the execution of a warrant
related to an off-reservation violation of state laws was not
essential to tribal self-government or internal relations and the

35' Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001).
358
id.

359 Id.

360

Id.

361 id.
362 id.
363 id.
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tribal court had no jurisdiction over section 1983 claims because it
' 364
was not a court of "general jurisdiction."
Most important to the concept of the erosion of tribal
sovereignty under the cooperative management approach is a
concurring opinion in Nevada v. Hicks. Justice Souter, with whom
Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined, held that the Montana
exceptions were not satisfied because the tribe had authorized the
state officials to serve the state warrants to a tribal member on
tribal lands.36 5 As stated by Souter, it was the uncontested fact that
the tribal court itself authorized service of the state warrant that
barred "any serious contention that the execution of that warrant
366
adversely affected the Tribes' political integrity."
The view expressed in this concurring option could have
very real impact on tribal/state co-management agreements. For
example, the GLIFWC MOU contains a strong provision that
clearly states that the USFS is responsible for enforcing federal
laws and regulations occurring on lands administered by the
service, while the tribes have primary right and responsibility to
enforce tribal regulations within the forests' treaty areas. 367 A
poorly worded or ambiguous co-management provision regarding
enforcement could lead the courts to interpret the very act of
entering into the agreement as a tribal government waiver of the
Montana exceptions. According to Kalt and Singer, if interpreted
broadly, the Nevada v. Hicks ruling could "prevent tribes from
asserting any regulatory powers whatsoever over nonmembers
unless those nonmembers had expressly contracted to voluntarily

Id.The Court also held that the petitioners were not required to exhaust their
claims in tribal court because the tribal court clearly lacked jurisdiction over
state officials for causes of action relating to their performance of official duties,
and adherence to the tribal exhaustion requirement would serve no purpose other
than delay. Id.
at 369.
365 Id. The Montana exceptions hold that a tribe may exert authority
over nonIndian activity on non-Indian lands within its reservation if the activity
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 566-67 (1981).
364

366
367

Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 386 (2001).
GLIFWC MOU §§ III(F), VI(E)(4).
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submit themselves to tribes' jurisdiction." 368 Non-Indians are
unlikely to do such a thing unless it is in their interest to do so.
2007]

C.

The Interest-Convergence Dilemma

In 1980 Harvard Law professor Derrick A. Bell, Jr.
published an important work that articulated for the first time a
theory that the interests of minorities in society would not 369
be
do.
so
to
majority
the
of
interest
the
in
was
upheld unless it
There are many examples of this "Interest-Convergence Dilemma"
throughout the history of tribal, federal, and state relations. Early
examples include the negotiation of agreements of trade and
protection made with Native nations by the first colonists, and the
Proclamation of 1763, in which King George agreed to protect
Indian lands so that tribes would not side with other European
Nations in war against England. Even the preeminent Marshall
Trilogy case of Worcester v. Georgia,with its ruling still cited as a
strong victory for Indian tribes because it held that Georgia laws
had no effect in Cherokee territory, was actually, when considered
in its historical context, an early exercise in federalism.
Secessionist Georgia, arguing states rights and the limited power of
the federal government, was put back in its place (temporarily) by
the judiciary. 370
Interest convergence can also be seen in the most recent
federal Indian policy of self-determination. The termination policy
was ended, in part, because it was in state government interest to
do so. These governments did not want to take on the added
financial burden of management and administration of formerly
federal programs and a new policy of self-determination helped

368
369

Kalt & Singer, supra note 15, at 15-16.
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the

Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (stating
interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when
it converges with interests of whites).
370 In response to Worcester v. Georgia, President Andrew Jackson purportedly
stated "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." See David
H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, and Robert A. Williams, Jr., Cases and
Materials on Federal Indian Law, 4th ed., p. 123 (Thomson West) (1998).
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avoid this problem. 37 ' Also, the Indian Self-Determination Act of
1975 not only allowed tribes to plan and administer federal
services, but by doing so the burden on federal agencies to
administer these programs was decreased.
As the cases studies show, ecosystem co-management is no
different. While the examined agreements held certain benefits for
tribes, there were also very real benefits for state and federal
agencies. The CRITFC and GLIFWC were created, in part, to
manage post-litigation court orders and holdings. It was in the
interest of the other parties involved to enter into agreements with
these organizations to avoid the costs of additional litigation and to
take advantage of the tribes' environmental expertise. In doing so,
the agencies helped to ensure sustainable resources for not only
Indians but for non-Indian interests as well.
Additionally, the Nez Perce MOA clearly suggests that
working with the tribe regarding wolf management would help
maintain Idaho sovereignty. This agreement would accelerate the
delisting of the gray wolf from the Endangered Species list, would
help avoid the return of the species to the list once delisted, and as
a beneficial side effect would help keep the federal government out
of Idaho business. Even prior to the 2005 MOA, Idaho engaged in
interest convergence. When the Nez Perce were forced to scaleback wolf monitoring in 1997 due to a lack of funds, Idaho
successfully urged the USFWS to give the Nez Perce additional
funding. 37 2 This made sense because minimizing wolf depredation
and potential human conflict problems required accurate and
timely information on the wolves and their location.3 73 Though
opposed to wolf reintroduction and unwilling to take part in a
recovery program, Idaho wanted to ensure monitoring activities
were continued in an effective manner.3 74 The state demanded that
the federal government and the tribe do a "good job of management" and additional funding was necessary to do the job.3 75
371 STEPHEN E. CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN
POLITICAL RESURGENCE,

124 (Oxford University Press) (1988).

372 Wilson, supra note 300, at 556.
373 Id. at 556-57.
374 Id. at 557
375 Id.
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The Interest-Convergence theory is a double-edged sword.
Tribes can use non-Indian interests as leverage in negotiating
agreements that benefit Indian peoples. They should be aware,
however, that the cooperative aspect of co-management agreements may last only as long as the benefits to non-Indians do. As
Robert A. Williams, Jr. reminds us, it is "much harder ...to secure
recognition and protection . . .of Indian group rights to selfdetermination and cultural sovereignty in American society than
for the far more familiar types of individualized rights that most
other minority groups want protected. 376
X.

CO-MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS AS A TOOL FOR
BUILDING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

"From a practical perspective . . . the most
successful cross-cultural relationships are ones that
are built on shared knowledge and mutual respect
rather than preconceived notions about ones culture,
government, or business philosophy. 377
Cornell and Kalt suggest that the greatest development
asset tribes possess is sovereignty or "the power to make decisions
about their own futures." 378 To exercise sovereignty effectively,
however, tribes must turn it into more than a de recto moral claim
or a de jure legal condition. 379 De facto sovereignty, sovereignty
in practice, is not just making the federal government live up to its
trust and treaty obligations. 380 It is recognizing that regardless of
stated policies of self-determination and government-to-government relations, tribal sovereignty operationally falls to the tribes

376 ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT,

INDIAN RIGHTS, AND

THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA, XXXV-XXXVi

(University of Minnesota Press 2005).
377 Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian
Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597, 629 (2004).

Cornell & Kalt, supra note 146, at 56.
Id.at 57
380 Kalt &Singer, supra note 15, at 26-27.
378
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who must assert sovereignty
by performing the functions of
38 1
governments.
effective
Ecosystem co-management is one area where tribes can
show the world that they are capable, effective governments.
Despite a history of colonization and assimilation, tribes are
developing, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing their own
environmental standards and playing a critical role in the sustainability of these resources for the benefit of Indians and non-Indians
alike. Federal and state agencies are recognizing the value and
expertise that Indian nations have to offer in the protection and
restoration of these resources and co-management agreements
offer tribes the ability to effectively exercise the sovereignty
promised by policy and law.
The case studies have shown various approaches to conflicts between state, federal, and tribal authorities over environmental and treaty reserved resources. Earlier agreements like the
1988 Columbia River Fish Management Plan were reflections of
de jure sovereignty, sovereignty allowed by law, but the steps the
Columbia River tribes took to give themselves a seat at the
negotiating table, including the creation of the CRITFC, was
sovereignty in practice, de facto sovereignty, leading ultimately to
the development of Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi Wa-Kish-Wit: Spirit of the
Salmon.
The GLIFWC MOU detailed a collaborative approach in
natural resource management to ensure that management of
national forest lands protected the tribes' ability to meaningfully
exercise their treaty rights. Requiring that the parties participate in
cultural sensitivity training and joint public education, the
agreement defined "meaningful consultation" and explicitly
incorporated the tribes' Model Off-Reservation National Forest
Gathering Code and Tribal Self-Regulation Agreement giving the
tribes primary right and responsibility to enforce their regulations
within the forests' treaty areas.
Ecosystem co-management agreements can build Native
nations because they can be used both as a practical tool for natural
resource management and as an instrument for improved
government-to-government relations. To do this, however, tribes
381

Id.
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must ascertain their rights to co-management and establish
strategic, capable institutions to implement forward looking
policies and procedures required to successfully carry out the comanagement role. For example, with its successful wolf recovery
program, the Nez Perce opened the door to a co-management
relationship with its fiercest opponent, the State of Idaho. These
agreements can facilitate de facto sovereignty because they can
motivate and build tribal capacity to perform as co-sovereigns
under them. These agreements can also be crafted so that neither
party relinquishes its right to self-government.
When considering the co-management approach for the
conservation and restoration of inter-jurisdictional natural resources, tribes must be prepared to "hold their own" at the negotiation
table.382 This means building up their expertise and management
capabilities so that their information and know-how is at least
equal, if not better than, the non-Indian government with which it
negotiates. 383 Strengthening their institutional capacity is another
step on the road to nation building. If an individual tribe does not
yet have the ability to take on the responsibilities such an
agreement might entail, it should consider reaching out to other
Native nations with similar interests for assistance. For example,
by pooling resources and expertise, inter-tribal organizations like
the CRITFC and GLIFWC are powerful voices that advance the
environmental resource management goals and cultural beliefs of
their member tribes while at the same time building successful
collaborative government-to-government relationships.
When drafting a co-management agreement with federal or
state agencies, there are several fundamental components that
tribes should consider including in the document. First, the
agreement should formally recognize the tribe as a sovereign
government with the power to govern its people, lands, and
resources, including any off-reservation resource that may be at

Cornell, Jorgensen, Kalt, & Spilde, supra note 14, at 30.
"[Out-administering, out-computing, and out-documenting non-Native
counterparts have put the winning cards in Native communities' hands." Id. at
382

383 Id.
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stake. 384 The agreement should include a statement of goals or
purpose that clearly affirms that the parties are coming together as
equal sovereigns with mutual interests. The agreement should
clearly state what those mutual interests are and include precise
definitions of avoid ambiguities that could cause conflicts after
implementation.
Included in the agreement should be a framework for carrying out the stated goals as well as a structure for effective,
cooperative consultation, communication, and data sharing on a
consistent and timely basis at the appropriate levels of government.
The agreement should precisely detail each party's obligations and
responsibilities, including procedures for implementation, monitoring, and dispute resolution. It should include specific requirements
that the agreement and underlying procedures, committees, and
working groups be reviewed at regular intervals for effectiveness.
The agreement should be flexible so that it can be modified as
necessary to deal with the "ever-changing circumstances" of
natural resource management for continued success. Provisions
should be included to help ensure that the goals of the agreement
do not get "politicized" to the point that co-management becomes
ineffective or the relationship of the parties degenerates.
Mandated cross-agency training and data sharing for all
parties is an excellent way to avoid potential cultural misunderstandings. Agreements should also include any special requirements necessary for handling sensitive or confidential information.
The agreement should specifically incorporate all policies, prior
agreements, and understandings that impact the parties and/or the
resources that are involved. This includes, but is not limited to,
policies recognizing government-to-government relations, consulting requirements, applicable treaties, and case law. Joint public
relations and financing campaigns will improve relations with both
the Indian and non-Indian public in regards to their shared
resources. The agreement should clearly delineate how shared
costs and/or funds will be allocated.

384
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Provisions for committees or working groups created by the
agreement should include that all parties participate equally in such
committees or groups. This will help avoid the danger of one party
being "outnumbered by other participants and consistently overruled in decision-making." 385 The agreement should reserve any
rights, claims, or defenses that are of importance to the parties.
For example, the GLIFWC MOU includes that its provisions "may
not reflect the full extent of the Tribes' ceded territory rights or of
the Forest Service's responsibilities to manage the National
Forests" and that the provisions are not intended to "alter or
abridge the tribes' underlying ceded territory rights or the USFS'
authorities to manage the National Forests in accordance with
applicable law." 386 Lastly, the agreement should include language

to help mitigate any potential Nevada v. Hicks problems and
should specifically articulate each party's law enforcement
responsibilities. For example, the agreement should include a
section stating:
1.

Primary enforcement and administration of justice responsibilities for the [TRIBE'S] regulations lies with the
[TRIBE] and its properly authorized agencies.

2.

The [TRIBE] and [FEDERAL/STATE AGENCY] may
coordinate their respective law enforcement activities and
establish cooperative law enforcement ventures, such as
joint patrols, effective communication systems, information
and potential violation referral processes, and joint training
activities. These coordinated law enforcement activities
shall include at least annual meetings between designated
enforcement personnel.

3.

Any cooperative law enforcement venture between the
[TRIBE] and [FEDERAL/STATE AGENCY] shall not be
construed as and is not a waiver, implicit or otherwise, of

385
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386 GLIFWC MOU, § 111(l)(3).
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the [TRIBE'S] sovereign right to exert authority over nonIndian activity on non-Indian lands within its reservation
when the activity threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the [TRIBE].
Ecosystem co-management agreements offer significant
advantages to Indian nations, but they are not without risks and
may not be the best solution for tribes seeking to assert sovereignty
over natural resources and the habitats on which they depend. The
conservation necessity doctrine could allow state regulation of offreservation treaty reserved rights if tribal environmental resource
regulations are considered inadequate for the conservation and
protection of endangered species. Ambiguous co-management
provisions regarding law enforcement could be interpreted by the
courts as an invitation for state regulation of on-reservation
resources and tribes must keep in mind that that for cooperative
relationships to continue, each party must realize benefits.
Successful co-management agreements are generally advantageous
not only for tribes but for non-Indians as well.
Tribes have had to work hard to have their interests not
only protected but also respected in the realm of federal and state
natural resource management.. 3 87 Co-management agreements can
help a tribe demonstrate that it has the "expertise to determine its
own goals and objectives and to chart its own course,"3 88 but each
tribe must gauge its capacity for de facto sovereignty and strategic
thinking before determining whether the co-management approach
will "build nations" or erode governments. "[B]eing treated like a
nation requires acting like a nation," 389 and for many tribes
sovereignty in practice is worth the risk.
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